The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824

Jeffery A. Jenkins, *Michigan State University*
Brian R. Sala, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

Theory: We extend research on the spatial theory of voting and the electoral connection by exploring how U.S. House members responded to Electoral College gridlock in the presidential election of 1824. We analyze whether John Quincy Adams's victory was consistent with a spatial-theoretic, ideological model of voting or more closely followed the standard historical account that emphasizes Adams's role in a vote-buying "corrupt bargain."
Hypotheses: The corrupt-bargain thesis predicts that several states won by Adams in the House ballot swung on votes cast by MCs closer to Andrew Jackson than to Adams. The sincere voting model predicts MCs to vote for the closest candidate. Prediction errors should be most frequent near the cutting line between Adams and his closest opponent.
Methods: We use a spatial model of sincere voting as a baseline against which to test the corrupt-bargain hypothesis. We use logistic regression to further test implications from the spatial model. Legislator and candidate preferences are based on transformed Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 1998), which locate ideal points for House members and the 1824 presidential candidates in a common space.
Results: Adams's victory and profile of support were consistent with the sincere voting model and did not support the corrupt-bargain hypothesis. Voting errors involving Adams lie systematically closer to the cutting line than did "correct" votes. Additional evidence from an examination of lame-duck MCs' subsequent careers and an analysis of the congressional elections of 1826 support our findings.

1. Introduction

In March 1825, the United States inaugurated John Quincy Adams, a plurality loser in both the popular and Electoral College votes held in late 1824, as its sixth president.[1] None of the candidates in 1824 had won the

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[1]The 1824 election was one of only three times in American history in which the plurality winner in the popular vote failed to win the presidency, the others being the elections of 1876 and 1888 Some sources also count the election of 1960 in this category, due to a dispute over how to count votes cast in Alabama for unpledged electors (see Longley and Peirce, 1996, 44–57).

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required majority of Electoral College votes; thus, the choice for president fell constitutionally to the House of Representatives, which was to select from among the top three candidates in the electoral vote. Standard historical interpretations of that election conclude that Adams's eventual victory was the result of corrupt maneuvering and vote buying within the House of Representatives (Livermore 1962; Hopkins 1971; McCormick 1982; Remini 1988, 1991; Gragg 1993; Longley and Peirce 1996). For example, Adams is believed to have promised Henry Clay the Secretary of State position in exchange for his influence over the votes of four key western states. Likewise, Adams is said to have promised Daniel Webster the ambassadorship to Great Britain in exchange for his efforts to secure the support of Maryland. In short, Adams is alleged to have outmaneuvered his opponents by cutting deals with those representatives who increased his probability of election.

A major difficulty in analyzing this "strategic" voting story involves assessing its validity: no theoretical alternative exists for comparison purposes. Based upon the spatial theory of voting, we present an appropriate "null" model against which we can then test the corrupt-bargain hypothesis. Using data on recorded votes in Congress and scaling techniques developed by Poole (1998) and Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997), we are able to place presidential candidates and House members in a common evaluative space and to analyze the election spatially.

Our results differ greatly from the strategic story—the spatial voting model provides a reasonable fit to the observed behaviors and predicts Adams to win a convincing victory under assumptions of complete information and sincere voting. These results are, furthermore, robust in the sense that the distribution of misclassified votes ("errors" in voting from our model's perspective) are consistent with a probabilistic voting model in which MCs most nearly indifferent between their top two choices are the most likely to vote against their sincere first preference. Our results strongly suggest that Adams did not steal the election by corrupting MCs whose ideological predilections were to vote for one of his opponents.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the historical literature on the 1824 election and set the stage for the 1825 House ballot. Next, we lay out the spatial model and briefly discuss the derivation of MC and presidential candidate ideal points. We then apply the spatial model to predict MC votes in the House balloting and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude our analysis and review our overall findings.

2. The Election of 1824 and the "Corrupt-Bargain" Thesis of Nonspatial Voting

The 1824 election was a watershed event in American history (Brown 1925; Dangerfield 1952; Hofstadter 1969). While it marked a break between the era of elite-driven politics and the modern era of mass electorates, the

enduring infamy of that election lies in how John Quincy Adams is alleged to have emerged victorious.

The main competitors in the election were the sitting Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts; the incumbent Speaker of the House, Henry Clay of Kentucky; the Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford of Georgia; and Senator Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, a war hero from the War of 1812 and subsequent campaigns in Florida. All four candidates, plus leading vice-presidential candidate John C. Calhoun (the Secretary of War), identified with the dominant Democratic-Republican party, although Adams had served as a Federalist in the Senate (1803–08).[2]

Crawford had been the early leader in the campaign and was the favorite to win endorsement in the traditional, Democratic-Republican congressional party nominating caucus (Remini 1988, 1991). In anticipation of this result, the other contestants and their congressional allies boycotted the nominating caucus (James 1938; Hopkins 1971), initiating a new era in presidential nominations, as state legislatures and popular conventions began endorsing candidates. Each candidate had regional strongholds that virtually insured that none would win a majority in the Electoral College. With no viable Federalist candidate in the race, Adams was expected to dominate in New England, Clay in Kentucky and the Western Reserve, and Crawford in the South. Jackson had been a late entrant into the race, having acknowledged his candidacy in May 1823, but was expected to be strong in the western states of Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi (James 1938). Expectations that the race would be thrown into the House were widespread (Heale 1982; Remini 1991).

Table 1 displays the results of the popular and Electoral College voting in the 1824 election. Since the constitutional rule in the House balloting permitted MCs only to vote for one of the top three finishers in the Electoral College vote, fourth-place Henry Clay's name was dropped. Of key importance to the final outcome, therefore, would be the dispositions of the delegations from the Clay-won states of Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio, plus the closely divided states of Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, and New Jersey. Adams likely would need to win six of these seven states (and hold onto the six New England states plus New York) in order to win the presidency. Conversely, if Jackson were to hold on to the eleven states in which he won Electoral College majorities, he would need to add only two more states to carry the day. Going into the House balloting, Jackson had two tremendous advantages: (1) he possessed momentum, as he had driven Calhoun from the field and had captured popular and Electoral College pluralities; and (2) he was the runner-up in each of the three states won by Clay in the popular voting.

[2]Adams became a supporter of the Jefferson administration, prompting the Federalist-dominated Massachusetts legislature to replace him in 1808.

Table 1. Popular and Electoral College Vote by State, 1824

	Popular Vote Totals				Electoral Vote Totals			
State	Adams	Jackson	Clay	Crawford	Adams	Jackson	Clay	Crawford
Alabama	2,422	9,429	96	1,656		5		
Connecticut	7,494			1,965	8			
Delaware					1			2
Georgia								9
Illinois	1,516	1,272	1,036	847	1	2		
Indiana	3,071	7,444	5,316			5		
Kentucky		6,356	16,982				14	
Louisiana					2	3		
Maine	10,289			2,336	9			
Maryland	14,632	14,523	695	3,364	3	7		1
Massachusetts	30,687				15			
Mississippi	1,654	3,121		119		3		
Missouri	159	1,166	2,042	32			3	
New Hampshire	9,389			643	8			
New Jersey	8,309	10,332		1,196		8		
New York					26	1	4	5
North Carolina		20,231		15,622		15		
Ohio	12,280	18,489	19,255				16	
Pennsylvania	5,441	35,736	1,690	4,206		28		
Rhode Island	2,144				4			
South Carolina						11		
Tennessee	216	20,197		312		11		
Vermont					7			
Virginia	3,419	2,975	419	8,558				24
Totals	113,122	151,271	47,531	40,856	84	99	37	41

Note: Scattered write-ins: Connecticut, 1,188; Indiana, 7; Massachusetts, 4,753; Missouri, 33; North Carolina, 256; Rhode Island, 200. Unpledged Republicans: Massachusetts, 6,616. Petersen (1963) reports the following vote totals, which differ from those above: Illinois – Jackson 1,901, Adams 1,542, Clay 1,047, and Crawford 219; New Jersey – Jackson 10,985, Adams 9,110, and Crawford 1,196.
Source: Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, Third Edition, 1994.

In explaining Adams's subsequent House victory, historical accounts largely agree with the contemporary opinions of Andrew Jackson's supporters: Adams must have struck "corrupt bargains" with key figures in Congress to capture votes and states that "should" have been won by Jackson.[3] In other words, enough MCs defied their constituents' interests and/or their own *policy preferences* to swing the outcome to Adams instead of Jackson. Unfortunately, we lack congressional district-level electoral returns from the House and presidential elections of 1824 to test for constituency shirking. Hence, we concentrate in this paper on the question of ideological shirking. Did MCs really ignore their ideological predilections and "sell" their votes to Adams?

We can test the corrupt-bargain thesis by assigning "ideal points" to members of the 18th House and the 1824 presidential candidates in a common space that accurately reflects the fundamental policy and ideological interests of the players involved. If this can be done, then determining sincere preference orderings for individual MCs becomes a trivial exercise. We use ideal point estimates for MCs and candidates derived from Poole-Rosenthal W-Nominate scores to test the corrupt-bargain thesis against a simple, null hypothesis of sincere, spatial voting. We argue that for the corrupt-bargain thesis to hold, Adams's winning margin must be shown to have resulted from MCs casting "insincere" votes in favor of Adams rather than voting as expected for either Jackson or William Crawford, the third candidate in the House contest.

The political circumstances of 1824–25—abstracting from the details of the popular and Electoral College voting for president in 1824—were particularly favorable to vote selling activities. Despite its majority status, the Jeffersonian coalition was unable to coordinate on a candidate prior to the popular election in 1824. Further, while Speaker Henry Clay (KY) had gone to some lengths during his tenure to maintain party coherence (Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Jenkins 1998), he had little ability to force members to vote one way or another on the presidential ballot.[4] The House election fell during

[3]The key alleged bargain was the appointment of House Speaker Henry Clay as Secretary of State (Hopkins 1971; Remini 1988, 1991). An appointment of then-Representative Daniel Webster (MA) to the ambassadorship to Great Britain was rumored but never tendered. Adams subsequently noted in his diaries that "all the friends of the Administration are agreed that the political appointment of Mr. Webster would be very unfavorable." Adams instead appointed another Federalist, former New York Senator Rufus King (Livermore 1962). Further, pressure was alleged to have been placed on John Scott, Missouri's sole representative, by Clay and other Western delegates to vote for Adams (Weiner 1966).

[4]Clay's position depended on majority support from the rank-and-file; if he succeeded in swinging enough votes one way or another to elect a president, he likely would leave the House for the Cabinet and thus be unable to punish MCs directly. If, on the other hand, he were to fail in his "king-making" efforts, he very likely would have faced a challenge to his speakership in the 19th

the lame-duck session of the 18th Congress; hence, none of the returning MCs could be held accountable by their constituents for their actions for nearly two years, nor could sanctions be applied to any of the eighty-one lame-duck MCs participating. This created an environment conducive for members to shirk *ideological* interests and to participate in ad hoc coalitions to pass policies (or to elect presidents) in return for side payments.[5]

Thus, the corrupt-bargain hypothesis must be taken seriously as a potential explanation for Adams's victory, in the sense that the short-term costs to MCs of voting insincerely probably were rather low. In order to make a valid case for the corruption thesis, however, we argue that members from key delegations must be shown to have supported Adams despite ideological predilections towards Jackson or Crawford. We turn next to a more formal examination of MC voting preferences in the presidential ballot.

3. The Spatial Theory of Voting and the 1824 Presidential Election Game

The conventional wisdom on the 1825 House balloting for president holds that a number of natural Jackson or Crawford supporters must have cast votes for Adams in response to promises of side payments from Adams or his supporters. This thesis fits quite naturally with a model of deviations from spatial-theoretic, sincere voting. In this section, we briefly explicate the spatial theory of voting and outline its application to the 1824 case.

Spatial voting theory is a special case of the common-sense notion that a voter can often rank-order the elements in a set of alternatives by some set of criteria and then choose the element that ranks highest on his list.[6] Voters are assumed to use common evaluative criteria to rank-order alternatives. We assume that a set of N voters $\{MC_1, MC_2, \ldots, MC_n\}$ each evaluate alternatives on M independent criteria, such that we can associate each MC_i with an ideal point in an M-dimensional Euclidean space, where each dimension corresponds to an evaluative criterion. Each MC's preferences can be de-

House. Of the 131 MCs returning to the 19th House who voted in the presidential balloting, fifty-two ultimately voted for Adams, fifty-three for Jackson, and twenty-six for Crawford. Presumably, many of the Crawford supporters ranked Jackson second and would have switched to him had there been ballots subsequent to the first (James 1938). Hence, Clay had to know that once he had announced a position in the race, his leadership position in the House would be threatened.

[5]By the same token, however, lame ducks probably would be the members most likely to shirk constituency interests to vote their own, personal preferences. We assume that the actions of MCs on roll-call votes reveal in some sense a balance between members' private interests and the positions most likely to help them win reelection. Thus on MC votes that differ sharply from the predictions of the spatial model, we infer that the member likely is trading his vote.

[6]What follows is only a bare sketch of the theory. For a thorough introduction to the spatial theory of voting, see Enelow and Hinich, 1984.

scribed by a utility function that meets certain restrictions, such that on each dimension each MC has single-peaked induced preferences.

Predicting sincere behavior in a spatial model then boils down to measuring the distances between alternatives and voter ideal points.[7] Under an assumption of complete information in which the respective locations of the alternatives and the voters were known by all voters with certainty, a sincere voter in a simple majority-rule election would cast his vote for his highest-ranked alternative. We will refer to a situation in which one of the three nominal candidates (Adams, Crawford, and Jackson) would have won under the House's decision rule via sincere voting as a "sincere voting equilibrium."

Voters, of course, need not behave sincerely (nor have complete information) in order to be considered rational. Under complete information, every voter can anticipate the sincere choices of all voters and, therefore, the sincere-voting outcome of an election. Voters who prefer an alternative that would not win via sincere voting under the given voting rule thus have an incentive to consider other voting strategies, such as voting for a lower-ranked alternative when the voter believes his top-ranked alternative cannot win but that the lower-ranked one could if he were to switch his vote. This is known as "sophisticated voting" (Farquharson 1969; Ordeshook 1986).[8] The sincere-voting equilibrium, if it exists, is simple to identify. If it were lacking, i.e., if none of the three were expected to win a majority of (states') votes on the first ballot via sincere MC votes, then we would have to take the sophisticated voting problem seriously.

A second and more serious threat to the sincere voting equilibrium is the possibility that MCs lack complete information or, more likely, that our ideal point estimates are not precise enough to accurately identify true sincere voting. If voters lack complete information and voting is simultaneous, then we would want to incorporate voters' beliefs about each others' preferences

[7]In spatial models, each individual's utility function specifies a functional relationship between movements along each orthogonal dimension; eg., how much in units of dimension X MC_i would be willing to trade a unit in dimension Y. Hence, "distance" is meant to imply weighted Euclidean distance (see Enelow and Hinich 1984, chap. three). In our case, we rely on Poole and Rosenthal's Nominate scores, which are constructed assuming equally weighted dimensions (circular indifference contours).

[8]For example, suppose neither Adams, Crawford, nor Jackson was expected to win a majority of sincere votes, but that a coalition (either explicit, as in a cooperative game-theoretic model, or implicit, as in a mixed-strategy equilibrium to the voting game) involving the supporters of any two candidates would be a majority. In a noncooperative game, the adherents for each candidate would have to weigh the odds of *supporters of other candidates* switching to their preferred candidate against the risk that they would not (or would switch to the third candidate), in order to best choose their own strategies. Considering for the moment only the adherents of Adams, Crawford, and Jackson, each would cast his vote with probability p for his most-preferred candidate and $1\text{-}p$ for his second-ranked candidate.

into their voting decisions. Alternately, if we drop our strong assumption that our ideal point estimates are error-free but retain the complete information assumption, it may be difficult to distinguish sincere from sophisticated voting behaviors.

We focus our attention first on determining whether a sincere voting equilibrium existed under the complete-information, fixed ideal point assumptions. Our voting game is based upon rules adopted by the House in 1825 for use in the presidential election. The 12th Amendment required that, in the event that no candidate won a majority of Electoral College votes, the House was to vote "by ballot" for president, where the votes were to be counted within each state delegation and each state then could cast a single vote for one of up to three candidates. In this case, the House specified that three candidates would be included: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and William Crawford.

Under the House rule, a state would cast a vote only if a *majority* of its *participating* delegation voted in favor of a particular candidate; in all other cases, the state's ballot was to be marked "divided." The rule did not specify a quorum for state delegations; hence, abstaining members could not induce a divided state ballot merely by preventing a quorum. If no candidate received at least thirteen of the twenty-four possible state votes, the balloting process would have repeated until (a) a president was elected or (b) the constitutionally-mandated deadline of March 4 passed, in which case the Vice-President Elect (John C. Calhoun, who had dropped out of the presidential race early in order to concentrate on the vice-presidency) would have been declared president. This latter outcome was at least conceivable, given the history of strategic machinations by partisan leaders in the Electoral College and House stages of voting for president (James 1938; McCormick 1982).[9]

Thus, the voting game consisted of an indefinite but finite number of iterations.[10] If we assume MCs had complete information about each others' (spatial) preferences, we can model the voting game as one with only a

[9]McCormick (1982, 68–9) notes that the lame-duck Federalist House majority in 1801 nearly deadlocked in trying to choose between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. It was this fiasco that motivated the passage of the 12th Amendment.

[10]Note that under this voting rule even if one of the candidates were able to beat each of the others in pairwise votes (a *Condorcet winner*), he still would not be guaranteed victory even if voters were constrained to vote sincerely. The dominant historical view suggests that, by the time of the balloting, Jackson would have been a Condorcet winner in a popular vote. But with three alternatives for voters to choose from directly, neither he nor Adams nor Crawford need have won the requisite majorities in a majority of states. If Calhoun were a Condorcet winner, on the other hand, he would have been strategically advantaged because his supporters needed only to prevent any of the other three from winning.

single stage, in which MCs would have either chosen a candidate from among the three present or the presidency would have fallen to Calhoun.[11]

A pure strategy for an individual MC consisted of choosing one of the three candidates or abstaining. Members could not vote directly for Calhoun; they could, however, vote *strategically* to try to prevent their state from arriving at a majority choice (thus inducing a "divided" ballot). If an individual MC's most preferred alternative of the four were Calhoun and his second-most preferred were Adams, he might refrain from voting for Adams if he believed his vote would be pivotal in securing a majority for Adams; however, *he would vote for someone*, most likely for that candidate whom he felt would finish third, because *abstention would have been a dominated strategy*. By abstaining, a Calhoun supporter would have lowered the threshold for an Adams victory, since Adams only needed a majority of a state's *voting* delegation to acquire its unit vote.

On the other hand, if Calhoun supporters believed that one of the three candidates was likely to win on a given ballot *regardless of their votes*, we assume that they would have ignored Calhoun as a consideration and chosen their highest ranked alternative from among the three actual candidates. Hence, we can modify the *sincere voting equilibrium* by arguing that sincere voting would have been an equilibrium if one of the candidates had been expected to win a majority of the states regardless of the votes of sincere Calhoun supporters. If Adams's victory was dependent on the support of Calhoun first-ranking MCs, we would treat that result as support for the corrupt-bargain hypothesis against our alternative hypothesis.

If we can show reasonable evidence supporting a claim that a majority of state delegations in the House were dominated by Adams supporters, we can reject the corrupt-bargain thesis. Our analytical approach, therefore, will be to formulate a sincere, spatial voting model of the game. If the model fits well at the individual level and we find that Adams should have won handily, we will have strong evidence against the corruption thesis. If the sincere model were not to predict Adams to win, we would accept the corrupt-bargain hypothesis as the most likely explanation of the observed outcome. This approach is biased in favor of the corrupt-bargain hypothesis, since it folds together true "corruption" explanations and explanations based on sophisticated (or strategic) voting.

[11]This approach ignores the potential for the dynamic development of coalitions in the House capable of electing a compromise candidate in favor of a noncooperative equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. A focus on explicit coalitions would take us beyond the realms of spatial voting theory and noncooperative games (for a discussion of the 1824 election from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective, see Riker 1962; Ordeshook, 1986).

In order to conduct this analysis, we need to locate ideal points for MCs and the presidential candidates in some common evaluative space. Following Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997), we assume that the relevant basic space has no more than two significant dimensions and corresponds to the "ideological" space they identify to explain member voting patterns on recorded votes in Congress (on the dimensionality of politics in the 18th Congress, see Kolodny 1996).[12] However, Poole-Rosenthal Nominate coordinates are based on the revealed preferences of MCs on common sets of recorded votes (not including votes on chamber officers or votes to elect the president, among other omissions). Only the members of the 18th House were eligible to vote in the House ballot for president; none of the presidential candidates were members of that House, nor was Vice President-Elect John C. Calhoun.

Our solution to the common-space problem was to take advantage of the fact that all of the candidates had previously served (and, in the cases of Adams and Calhoun, would subsequently serve) in either the House or the Senate. In a recent paper, Poole (1998) has shown a method for recovering a "basic space" from a set of independently-constructed issue scales. The procedure is, "in effect, [a method of performing] a singular value decomposition of the rectangular matrix with missing elements" (Poole 1998, 954). The application involves pooling the scores of members who served a threshold number of congresses (with service in the House or the Senate, but preferably in both) during an interval to form an unbalanced panel, to then estimate the "best-fitting *average* coordinates for the individuals over the time span" (Poole 1998, 979).

The MC and candidate ideal points we use here were generated by Keith Poole using his procedure on W-Nominate scores for members serving during the 3rd Congress (1794–95) through the 29th Congress (1845–47). There were a total of 2572 members of Congress through this period of which 310 served in five or more Congresses and were the basis of the scaling (156 House only, 53 Senate only, 101 both). Common space coordinates for the 2262 other members were estimated by running a simple OLS model to find the best mappings from the 310 common space members into the original W-Nominate coordinates. The common space coordinates for each of the 2262 is the mean of their transformed W-Nominate coordinates. Of the 213 members of the 18th House eligible to vote in the presidential ballot, sixty-nine served five or more terms in Congress during their careers and, therefore, were included in the procedure to generate the initial common-space scores, as were Adams and Calhoun.

[12]Kolodny (1996) identifies two salient "dimensions" of political conflict during this period: a nationalism vs. states' rights dimension and a slavery vs. anti-slavery dimension.

Poole's procedure estimates a single set of ideal-point coordinates for the career of each member serving in Congress. Thus for the common-space estimates to make sense, we have to assume that MCs and senators maintain consistent ideologies throughout their careers in Congress, including changes from one chamber to the other. This approach is not without its problems. Both the underlying Nominate scores and the common-space scores are estimates and, therefore, contain error. If the underlying Nominate scores fit the data poorly, the subsequent procedure will certainly compound the level of uncertainty about how well the estimated ideal points represent members' actual interests. Poole and Rosenthal report in their book that the spatial model did not fit the observed data well during the Era of Good Feelings (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Figure B.1 and B.2, 253–4). The 18th Congress was not one of the better-fitting cases in the original D-Nominate estimates; the first-dimension correctly classified only about 74 percent of the member-votes in the House, while the second raised the bar to about 77 percent. The common-space transformations also provided only a modest fit to the underlying W-Nominate scores for the 18th Congress (the R^2 statistics for the mapping of the common-space coordinate subset into W-Nominate scores for the 18th House were 0.525 for the first dimension and 0.679 for the second dimension). These results suggest that the maintained hypothesis of stable ideological locations for members throughout their careers may not be as plausible for this era as Poole found it to be for the 1937–95 period (1998).[13]

Nonetheless, the coordinates are the best (only!) estimates currently available that meet our purposes, and they seem quite plausible on a number of criteria. For example, the first dimension differentiates state delegations by region, with nearly all New England representatives concentrated to the right-hand side of the scale and nearly all "solid south" representatives concentrated to the left, as shown in Figure 1. Members from New England states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) are indicated by "NE" icons in the figure; members from southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, the Carolinas, and Virginia) are marked with "S" icons.[14] The three presidential candidates and Vice-President Elect Calhoun and Speaker Henry Clay are labeled by numerals (1 for Adams, 2 for Jackson, 3 for Crawford, 4 for Calhoun, 5 for Clay). Border-, western-, and mid-Atlantic state members tend to lie in between the New England and southern member ideal-points.

[13]Poole, personal communication, March 3, 1997. The complete set of common-space scores and Prof. Poole's cautionary notes on the use of this data are available upon request from the authors.

[14]Note, however, that Alabama and Mississippi were considered "western" states politically at the time, despite their slave-holding status.

Figure 1. Common-Space Nominate Scores by Region



Key: Icons indicate common-space, two-dimensional ideal points for selected members of the 18th House and the presidential candidates in the 1824 election.
S: MCs from Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, the Carolinas, and Virginia)
NE: MCs from New England states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont)
1: John Quincy Adams
2: Andrew Jackson
3: William Crawford
4: John C. Calhoun
5: Henry Clay

As the figure indicates, the estimated ideal points for John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay clustered together near the horizontal axis well to the right. This proximity between the two is roughly consistent with notions about Adams and Clay. Despite their alleged personal aversion to one another, Adams and Clay were similar in their policy stances. Remini (1991, 239) contends that "of all the candidates, Adams's principles and ideas on political economy came closest to [Clay's] own." Adams wholeheartedly supported the tenets of Clay's American System, a set of governmental programs based upon high tariffs, internal improvements, and a national bank.[15]

[15]According to Roseboom (1917) and Ratcliffe (1973), Adams secured the support of Ohio MCs by promising to support Clay's American System.

Andrew Jackson and William Crawford look almost identical spatially, which is roughly consistent with their views and ideals. Both men were pro-slavery, and both opposed the high tariffs and internal improvements supported by Clay and Adams (although Jackson's record in the 18th Senate challenges this latter view). In keeping with their support of limited government and agrarian-based economic policy, both Jackson and Crawford claimed to be the heir to the "traditional" school of Jeffersonian Republicanism (Remini 1988; Kolodny 1996). The separation between Jackson/Crawford and Calhoun along the second dimension can perhaps be attributed to the issue of nationalism. Both Jackson and Crawford were strongly pro-union, while Calhoun was a firm proponent of states' rights—as witnessed by his subsequent advocation of "nullification" (Niven 1988; Freehling 1990).

4. A Sincere Victory for Adams: Evidence from the Spatial Models

In the previous section, we argued that the presidential election game in 1825 was amenable to spatial-theoretic analysis. We showed that if one of the candidates was sincerely favored by a majority of state delegations, then each MC could be expected to cast his (sincere) vote for his most preferred candidate among Adams, Crawford, and Jackson. We turn now to applying the spatial model on a state-by-state basis. If we can show good reason to believe that Adams held the allegiance of a majority of states via sincere voting, we can reject the corrupt-bargain thesis.

No controversy surrounds the expected votes of members from the New England states. Adams dominated the popular vote in those states and swept the Electoral College vote as well (see Table 1).[16] The spatial orientation of New England MCs confirms our expectations that Adams should have won these states easily (and increases our confidence in the ideal point estimates). Looking a bit deeper, we find that Adams spatially dominated every region of the country outside of the South. On average, Adams was much closer to MCs in New England, the mid-Atlantic states, and the West than any of the other three candidates (including Calhoun). In each of these regions, the average squared distance from MC to Adams was roughly one-third or less than the distance to any other candidate.[17]

The distribution of predicted Adams supporters by state is summarized in Table 2. We predict that 120 of 209 individual MCs (57.4 percent) would have ranked Adams first of the four candidates (Calhoun being the fourth) in

[16]Vote data for individual MCs was taken from *Niles' Weekly Register* (Vol. 27, Feb. 19, 1825, 387), reprinted in Martis (1989). Because the House vote for president was not a recorded roll call *per se*, it was not included in the set of votes used to generate the Nominate scores.

[17]This data is available from the authors upon written request.

Table 2. Members Ranking Adams First, by State Delegation

	Revealed Outcome Feb 9, 1825	1-Dimensional Predicted Outcome	2-Dimensional Predicted Outcome
Alabama	0 of 3	0 of 3	0 of 3
Connecticut	6 of 6	6 of 6	6 of 6
Delaware	0 of 1	1 of 1	1 of 1
Georgia	0 of 7	0 of 7	0 of 7
Illinois	1 of 1	1 of 1	1 of 1
Indiana*	0 of 3	2 of 2	2 of 2
Kentucky	8 of 12	11 of 12	12 of 12
Louisiana	2 of 3	1 of 3	3 of 3
Maine	7 of 7	6 of 7	5 of 7
Maryland	5 of 9	4 of 9	6 of 9
Massachusetts	12 of 13	12 of 13	12 of 13
Mississippi	0 of 1	0 of 1	0 of 1
Missouri	1 of 1	1 of 1	1 of 1
New Hampshire	6 of 6	5 of 6	4 of 6
New Jersey	1 of 6	6 of 6	6 of 6
New York	18 of 34	28 of 34	24 of 34
North Carolina*	1 of 13	3 of 12	1 of 12
Ohio	10 of 14	14 of 14	14 of 14
Pennsylvania	1 of 26	22 of 26	23 of 26
Rhode Island	2 of 2	2 of 2	2 of 2
South Carolina	0 of 9	0 of 9	0 of 9
Tennessee	0 of 9	0 of 9	2 of 9
Vermont*	5 of 5	4 of 4	4 of 4
Virginia	1 of 21	2 of 21	2 of 21

**Note:* We do not have common-space estimates for three MCs: Jacob Call of IN, George Outlaw of NC, and Henry Olin of VT), who participated in the February 9, 1825, House vote.

the one-dimensional model (118/209 or 56.5 percent in the two-dimensional model). Based on these rankings, Adams should have held majorities in fourteen states (in both models), one more than he would need to win the presidency. As such, Calhoun supporters would not have been able to affect the outcome in favor of Calhoun; thus we would expect them to cast their votes instead for their second-favorite candidates. We will, therefore, not consider Calhoun's "candidacy" to be a viable alternative throughout the rest of the analysis.

The one-dimensional sincere-voting spatial model correctly classifies 107 of 209 (51.2 percent) votes cast by MCs for whom we have ideal-point estimates. The two-dimensional model correctly classifies 133/209 (63.6 percent).[18] If we consider only Adams/Not Adams votes, the one-dimensional

[18]Only one MC failed to vote: Robert S. Garnett (VA), who was ill. Garnett was a predicted Jackson supporter in the one-dimensional model (Crawford in the two-dimensional model).

model improves to 148/209 (70.8 percent) and the two-dimensional model to 150/209 (71.8 percent), indicating that 40 percent of the misclassifications involved only crossovers between Jackson voters and (spatial) Crawford supporters or vice-versa.[19] Given that our ideal-point estimates for Crawford and Jackson place them so close to one another, we do not regard these misclassifications as significant disconfirming evidence for the spatial model or as reflecting on the corrupt-bargain thesis.

These results compare favorably with two alternative, naive models: (1) assuming that all MCs voted against Adams and (2) assuming that all MCs from nonslave states voted for Adams and all MCs from slave states voted against Adams. The all anti-Adams model correctly predicts 123/209 (58.9 percent) and the slave/nonslave model correctly predicts 138/209 (66 percent) of the Adams/Non-Adams vote. Our spatial models provide a proportional reduction in error (PRE) of 14.1 percent (one-dimensional model; 16.9 percent for the two-dimensional model) over the slave/nonslave model, and 29.1 percent (one-dimension; 31.4 percent for the two-dimensional model) over the all anti-Adams model.

Analyzing the individual-level vote data more closely, we expect the probability of a classification error to vary inversely with the distance between an MC's ideal point and the midpoint or cutting line between Adams and anti-Adams positions. The critical point dividing expected-Adams supporters from opponents in the one-dimensional model lies halfway between Adams's induced ideal point and William Crawford's induced ideal point on the first dimension. In a difference of means test, we found the average squared distance from the critical point to be significantly smaller (by 32 percent) for the misclassified observations than for the correctly classified ones ($t = -2.15$), strongly supporting the spatial model.

Of the sixty-one classification errors in which the one-dimensional spatial model predicts support for Adams but we observe support for Jackson/Crawford or vice-versa, the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey account for twenty-eight, all but one of whom were predicted Adams supporters who in fact voted for Jackson. These two states, therefore, provide the strongest evidence against the naive spatial model.[20] New York accounts for another

[19] These predictions are not as accurate as typical roll-call studies, which often correctly classify around 80 percent of vote choices. Most roll-call studies endogenously choose the cutting line between yea and nay positions to minimize classification errors, whereas our cutting lines are fixed exogenously, making prediction more difficult.

[20] Our model includes no direct assessments of constituency preferences. Instead, we assume that constituency policy preferences are incorporated into MC ideal points. Thus our spatial model does not account for Jackson's dominance of the popular vote in Pennsylvania (see Table 1). A fully specified model of MC choice in this election would factor in additional constituency-level information, such as the popular vote by congressional district and some measure of how "safe" the district was for the incumbent, neither of which is generally available for 1824.

ten errors—all predicted Adams supporters who voted instead for Crawford or Jackson. In this case, however, the errors did not affect the predicted state vote, which was for Adams. Classification errors do affect the state vote in two states lost by Adams that we predicted him to win—Indiana and Delaware, which were won by Jackson and Crawford, respectively.

Supplementing the analysis of classification errors, we construct formal probabilistic voting models to investigate election results. We specify three logit models, each testing a particular tenet of the corruption thesis. First, we begin with a simple logit model with one independent variable—a proxy for ideology—which for each MC is equal to his squared, spatial distance to Adams *minus* his squared, spatial distance to Jackson. If the corruption hypothesis were true, the model's intercept should be positive and significant, indicating insincere voting in the direction of Adams. Instead, we find the intercept term to be *negative* and significant ($z = -4.83$), counter to the Adams vote-buying hypothesis.

We can explore the "corrupt-bargain" thesis between Adams and Clay more closely by adding a dummy variable to the basic logit model to proxy for Clay-won states (Kentucky, Ohio, and Missouri) in the electoral balloting. If a deal was struck between Adams and Clay, we'd expect the "Clay-state" dummy to be positive and significant, denoting Adams's acquisition of insincere votes. While we find that the Clay-state variable is indeed positive, it is *not* significantly different from zero ($z = 1.14$). This finding is consistent with an analysis of key members from the delegations in question. Missouri's sole representative, John Scott, was nearly identical ideologically to Adams. The *average* squared distance from Adams in Ohio's delegation was smaller than the *minimum* distance from any of the other three candidates (including Calhoun). Only in Kentucky, Clay's home state, was there any hint of evidence that members might not prefer Adams. But even there, a difference of means test indicates that the average (one-dimensional) MC distance to Adams's ideal point was significantly smaller than the average distance to the next closest challenger ($t = -3.26$). Thus, on spatial grounds, we find no evidence to support the corrupt-bargain hypothesis in these key states.

Finally, we can investigate one last tenet of the corruption thesis by examining those states that would have been "cheapest" for Adams to buy in the House election: states that did not produce definitive winners in the popular or electoral balloting. Based on the vote totals presented in Table 1, four states appear to fit this bill: Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, and New Jersey. Historical accounts also suggest that representatives from each of these states were open to outside influence at various points prior to the House election. Remini (1988, 1991, 264) suggests that Adams used his personal friendship with Illinois' sole representative, Daniel Cook, to solicit his vote,

to the point where Cook "may . . . have been bribed." Louisiana's representatives were believed to have possessed long-standing personal ties to Clay, as well as to Adams, which both attempted to exploit (Brown 1926). Federalist members of the Maryland delegation were reported to have offered their votes to several of the candidates, most notably to Adams, in exchange for promises of office (Livermore 1962). Finally, the New Jersey delegation was given no instructions by the state legislature and was thought to have been undecided on the eve of election, as their leader, Samuel Southard, could not decide between Adams and Jackson (Ershkowitz 1966).

By adding an additional dummy variable to the logit model to proxy for members from Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, and New Jersey, we can determine if any empirical evidence exists to connect Adams to possible vote buying in these states. If Adams purchased some of these "cheap" votes, we would expect the dummy variable to be positive and significant. We find that while the dummy is positive, it is *not* significant ($z = 0.88$). Thus, we uncover no evidence to connect Adams to vote buying in those states that appeared to have been most accessible to such a strategy.[21]

Overall, then, the results from our models capture the revealed outcome (Adams's victory in the House election) quite well, as we predict Adams to win fifteen and seventeen states in the one-dimensional and two-dimensional models, respectively.[22] As Table 3 indicates, we correctly predict thirteen of twenty-four state votes in the one-dimensional model and twenty of twenty-four states in the two-dimensional model. If the criterion is Adams/Not Adams, we correctly predict eighteen of twenty-four states in the one-dimensional model and twenty of twenty-four states in the two-dimensional model.[23] Classification errors in the one-dimensional model were, on average, much closer to the critical point dividing Adams supporters from opponents than were correctly-classified MCs. Furthermore, little evidence exists from simple vote-choice models to suggest vote buying or corruption on the part of Adams. Finally, all predicted Calhoun supporters

[21]Our null findings here could in fact be consistent with evidence that Adams's core supporters did indeed provide side payments to certain, marginal supporters. Groseclose and Snyder (1996), for example, present a model in which political entrepreneurs secure winning coalitions by providing side-payments to the coalition members most likely to defect, thus increasing the costs to their opponents to break up the winning coalition.

[22]Earlier, we claimed that Clay held majorities in fourteen states via sincere, spatial voting. In that analysis, we included Calhoun within the set of candidate alternatives. Because we found that Calhoun supporters could not strategically alter the outcome, we "dropped" Calhoun as an alternative. When we look simply at a three-candidate race, Adams wins fifteen and seventeen states in one- and two-dimensional sincere, spatial analyses, respectively.

[23]The difference between the two models is due to Louisiana and Maryland, both of which were won by Adams in the House balloting. Our two-dimensional model correctly predicts them as Adams states, while the one-dimensional model predicts them to be Crawford states.

Table 3. Revealed and Predicted House Ballot Results, by State

	Revealed Outcome February 9, 1825	1-Dimensional Predicted Outcome	2-Dimensional Predicted Outcome
Alabama	Jackson	Crawford	Jackson
Connecticut	Adams	Adams	Adams
Delaware	Crawford	Adams	Adams
Georgia	Crawford	Crawford	Crawford
Illinois	Adams	Adams	Adams
Indiana	Jackson	Adams	Adams
Kentucky	Adams	Adams	Adams
Louisiana	Adams	Crawford	Adams
Maine	Adams	Adams	Adams
Maryland	Adams	Crawford	Adams
Massachusetts	Adams	Adams	Adams
Mississippi	Jackson	Crawford	Jackson
Missouri	Adams	Adams	Adams
New Hampshire	Adams	Adams	Adams
New Jersey	Jackson	Adams	Adams
New York	Adams	Adams	Adams
North Carolina	Crawford	split	Crawford
Ohio	Adams	Adams	Adams
Pennsylvania	Jackson	Adams	Adams
Rhode Island	Adams	Adams	Adams
South Carolina	Jackson	Crawford	Jackson
Tennessee	Jackson	Crawford	Jackson
Vermont	Adams	Adams	Adams
Virginia	Crawford	Crawford	Crawford

cast votes, suggesting that they expected Adams to win on the first ballot. Based on the totality of these results, we strongly question the corrupt-bargain thesis.

5. Corrupt Bargains, the Electoral Connection, and the 1825 House Vote

In this section, we address several more implications of the corrupt-bargain thesis. If Adams did indeed buy the House election, we would have expected circumstantial evidence of the purchase to show up in two key arenas. First, we would have expected Adams supporters who voted contrary to their constituents' preferences to have been punished at the polls. Second, we would have expected a high proportion of "insincere" supporters of Adams to receive tangible compensation, such as appointments to federal office during Adams's administration. We address each of these hypotheses in turn.

In addition to a sincere, spatial voting analysis, we also can examine the corrupt-bargain thesis by tracking the careers of those MCs who voted in the presidential balloting. The presidential ballot took place during the lame-duck session of the 18th House. 131 MCs who voted had already been elected to the 19th House, while an additional eighty-one MCs were lame ducks.

We would expect to observe a delayed fallout after Adams's victory among those MCs reelected to the 19th House.[24] If an MC who supported Adams did so in contradiction to the collective preferences of his constituents, we would expect his constituents to remove him in favor of a Jacksonian at the next opportunity, which would have been the congressional elections of 1826. We examined the reelection success of both Adams and Jackson supporters and of the subset of Adams voters who were misclassified by the spatial model. If Adams supporters did defy their constituents, we would expect them to have been significantly less successful at retaining their seats for the Adams party than Jackson supporters were at retaining seats for their party. Stated differently, we anticipate a disproportionately higher level of turnover of Adams-controlled seats.

Our findings run contrary to these expectations: *the Adams faction was able to retain a higher proportion of its seats in the 20th House than was the Jackson faction.* Of the fifty-two MCs who voted for Adams in the House election and returned to the 19th House, forty-seven of those seats, or 90 percent, remained within the Adams camp (as classified by Martis 1989) in the 20th House. In contrast, of the fifty-two MCs who voted for Jackson in the House balloting and returned to the 19th House, forty-four of those seats, or 85 percent, remained within the Jackson camp in the 20th House. In the one-dimensional model, only one of the five seats lost by Adams could be attributed to ideological shirking, while seven of the eight seats lost by Jackson were attributable to ideological shirking (zero of five and seven of eight, respectively, in the two-dimensional case). Based on these results, we do not uncover the negative sanctions associated with an "electoral connection" story, thereby questioning the validity of the corrupt-bargain thesis.

Lame ducks faced a distinctly different set of costs and benefits, relative to continuing MCs. Since they were not returning to the 19th House, they could not be held accountable for their votes, either by their constituents or by party leaders. These MCs' votes, therefore, should have been the lowest-priced marketable votes in the presidential balloting, if any were for sale. Lame ducks, therefore, should have played a prominent role in whatever corruption was involved in the House balloting. We thus would expect to find a

[24]For evidence of an "electoral connection" in the 19th Century House, see Swift (1987); Stewart (1989); Swift and Brady (1994); and Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996).

significantly greater proportion of Adams's lame-duck votes than continuing MC votes to be insincere ("false positives" or misclassifications in favor of Adams). While our results substantiate this expectation, the differences are small. In the one-dimensional model, only four of Adams's thirty-four lame-duck votes (11.8 percent) were insincere, relative to four of fifty-two (7.7 percent) of returning MCs. In the two-dimensional model, again only four of Adams's thirty-four lame-duck votes were insincere, relative to three of fifty-two (5.8 percent) of returning MCs. The more meaningful finding from these results is that a large proportion of Adams's total was consistent with sincere voting (90.7 percent in the one-dimensional model; 91.9 percent in two dimensions).

Likewise, we would expect to find a significantly greater proportion of Adams's lame-duck support to be insincere relative to Jackson's and Crawford's. This proves not to be the case. In the one-dimensional model, ten of Crawford's twenty-seven lame-duck votes (37 percent) and nine of Jackson's seventeen lame-duck votes (52.9 percent) were misclassifications ("insincere" votes); the two-dimensional results are similar.

We also investigated whether Adams compensated lame ducks for their support. Under the corrupt-bargain thesis, we would have expected lame ducks to receive compensation, the easiest of which to assess would have been appointments to federal office during Adams's administration. Using the *Biographical Directory of Congress*, we investigated the political careers of the lame ducks and found *no* evidence for appointive-based corruption. *We could not find a single case in which Adams appointed a lame-duck supporter, whether sincere or insincere, to office.* We also checked the list of federal appointments published by Hezekiah Niles in his *Weekly Register* for the period covering Adams's presidency.[25] We again found no evidence of lame-duck supporters being rewarded with federal positions. These results again provide evidence disconfirming the corrupt-bargain thesis.

Finally, we can assess how pivotal the lame ducks were in Adams's eventual victory, relative to how their successors would have behaved. Stated another way, we can evaluate how the lame ducks voted in comparison to how their constituents *wanted* them to vote, based on the results of the congressional elections of 1824. We thus analyze the House vote for president as if it had occurred in the 19th House; this will suggest how the lame ducks' successors would have voted. We find that Adams still would have won a first-ballot victory, as he would have received the votes of seventeen states in both the one-dimensional and two-dimensional models. Calhoun supporters could not have played a strategic role in the process, as Calhoun

[25]*Niles Weekly Register*, Volume XXVIII, 43–6, 80, 192, 288.

would have been preferred to Adams in only two Adams-controlled states: Delaware and Louisiana (in both models). Thus, we uncover little evidence to suggest that lame ducks voted differently than their successors would have voted.

6. Conclusion

Most historical accounts of the House election of 1825 contend that the balloting process was rich with intrigue. They have asserted that John Quincy Adams's victory was a result of vote buying and corrupt deal making, with the principal accusation being that he entered into a "bargain" with Henry Clay for the support of key Western states: in exchange for Clay's support, Adams rewarded him with the position of Secretary of State. Little evidence exists beyond some historical anecdotes to confirm these allegations, however.

We establish a baseline against which to evaluate the corrupt-bargain thesis. Using common-space W-Nominate scores for all presidential candidates and members of the 18th House, we construct a sincere, spatial voting model to apply to the House election for president. Our findings suggest that Adams's victory is consistent with MCs voting their "true" revealed, spatial preferences. We find that Adams's margin of victory should have been greater than the actual bare majority he received: we predict Adams to win fifteen and seventeen of the twenty-four states, respectively, in our-one dimensional and two-dimensional analyses.

The spatial models predicted the observed behavior quite well. Our one-dimensional model correctly classified 71 percent of the Adams/Not Adams vote, and classification errors were significantly closer to the cut point between Adams and his closest competitor than were correctly-classified votes. Simple vote choice models did not indicate the existence of vote buying or corruption on the part of Adams in the House election for President. Additionally, we found no significant electoral evidence to suggest that Adams supporters were subsequently punished at the polls, nor evidence that lame-duck Adams supporters voted differently than their successors would have in the 19th House.

In addition, because the 1825 ballot was held during a lame-duck session of Congress, an especially attractive environment was present for vote buying by interested outsiders (such as presidential candidates) and ideological shirking by MCs. The returning MCs knew they could not be punished by their constituents for nearly two years, giving them time to get back in the good graces of short-memoried voters—while the lame-ducks had nothing to fear at all from constituency dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, we found little evidence to suggest that MCs shirked.

From this preponderance of evidence, we conclude that MCs' vote choices in the 1825 House balloting were driven primarily by ideological considerations and not by offers of side payments and that these ideological considerations were generally consistent with MCs' constituency preferences.

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