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The Institutional Origins of the Republican Party: Spatial Voting and the House Speakership Election of 1855–56

This study explores the Republican Party's origins at the institutional level, specifically in the 34th House of Representatives. We focus on an especially critical event, the House speakership election of 1855–56, which resulted in the first major victory for the new party. We conduct our analysis by applying the spatial theory of voting to the House balloting for Speaker, using a scaling technique developed by Poole (1998). Results from our spatial model suggest that slavery was the overriding determinant of vote choice throughout the two-month speakership battle. Its effects were considerable from the outset, even in multiple candidate rounds, and proved to be more influential as the balloting progressed. We also find that the issue of nativism, which was so important in the previous congressional elections and would continue to affect the Republicans' electoral fortunes for several more years, had *no* impact on members' votes for speaker. Once elected, the new Republican speaker, Nathaniel Banks, organized the House around anti-slavery tenets, stacking both committees and chairs with anti-slavery advocates. Overall, these results suggest that while the Republicans would struggle for an *electoral* identity deep into the 1850s—balancing the competing interests of slavery and nativism to win office—they emerged as a single-issue, anti-slavery coalition at the *institutional* level as early as 1855.

I. Introduction

The decade prior to the Civil War was one of the most unstable partisan periods in American history (Anbinder 1992; Fogel 1992; Foner 1995; Gienapp 1987; Holt 1978; Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 1993, 1997; Potter 1976; Silbey 1985). In the early 1850s, the Whigs' interregional alliance disintegrated, and an extended period of one-party Democratic rule seemed imminent. However, a new group of anti-administration candidates, running on disparate tickets, emerged in 1854–55 to challenge Democratic dominance. A portion of this group

was elected to the House in 1856 and, after a period of coalescing, took control of the chamber. Once in charge, they became known as the Republican Party. Four years later, the Republicans would capture both chambers of Congress as well as the presidency, sowing the seeds for secession and war.

In this paper, we examine one aspect of Republican Party development: its origin at the *institutional level*, specifically in the 34th House of Representatives. Our analysis focuses on the speakership election of 1855–56, a bitterly fought contest that lasted two months and totaled 133 ballots. In the end, Nathaniel Banks, an anti-slavery representative from Massachusetts, was elected by a three-vote margin over William Aiken, a Democrat from South Carolina, thus establishing the first national victory for the fledgling party.

Despite its playing a critical role in Republican Party development, the speakership election of 1855–56 has not been the subject of a theoretical analysis. All accounts of the event have been descriptive in nature (Anbinder 1992; Gienapp 1987; Harrington 1939; Hollcroft 1956; Silbey 1989). We provide an analysis rooted in positive political theory. Specifically, we use a vote-scaling technique developed by Poole (1998) to construct a sincere spatial voting model to predict members' vote choices in the House balloting.

Our results suggest that the two-month series of votes can largely be explained by a unidimensional spatial model *in which slavery represents the substantive dimension*. This is important for two reasons. First, it is consistent with a host of both historical and theoretical studies that contend that slavery was the major issue in American politics in the decade prior to the Civil War.[1] Second, it provides new insights into the institutional origins of the Republican Party. We find that the diverse group of anti-administration representatives who took their seats shortly before the start of the speakership contest became a coherent ideological coalition *during* the balloting. That is, they coalesced and elected a speaker on the basis of a *single* issue: slavery. We find that the issue of nativism, which was so important in the prior congressional elections, had *no* impact on MCs' votes for speaker. Finally, we find that Banks, once elected, organized the House around anti-slavery tenets, laying the groundwork for the party's further development in subsequent Congresses. Thus, while historians contend that the Republicans struggled for a distinct *electoral* identity into the late 1850s, balancing the competing interests of slavery and nativism (Anbinder 1992; Gienapp 1987), our results suggest that they emerged as a single-issue, anti-slavery coalition at the *institutional* level as early as 1855.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we describe the political climate in the late 1840s and early 1850s to set the stage for the speakership election in 1855. In section III, we lay out the spatial model and discuss Poole's technique for estimating ideal points. In section IV, we analyze the House balloting, apply the spatial model to predict MC votes, and discuss the results. In section V, we examine the organization of the House after the speakership contest and the ties between Banks's ideological coalition and the Republican Party in subsequent Congresses. In section VI, we conclude our analysis.

II. Slavery and Political Instability, 1845–55

Before turning our attention to the speakership election of 1855–56, we first examine the role that slavery played in fostering partisan instability during the prior decade. This will allow us to justify our later "frame" of the speakership battle in which we cast slavery as the overriding determinant of vote choice.

Slavery and Sectional Balance

As the United States edged toward the second half of the nineteenth century, the issue of slavery, which had lain dormant for nearly thirty years, reemerged on the national scene. Beginning in 1820, the Missouri Compromise had successfully resolved the slavery issue and produced a fragile national harmony, thanks to the balance rule, an explicit component of the agreement. The balance rule stipulated that (a) the Union would be composed of an equal number of slave and non-slave states, and (b) slave and non-slave states would be admitted in pairs, which would, in effect, furnish the South with a check against incursions by the North. Any policies that would harm the South's "peculiar institution" could be vetoed by a united Southern delegation in the Senate (Aldrich 1995, 129; Weingast 1991, 6–8).

By the middle 1840s, however, the necessary condition for maintaining balance had disappeared: the South had nowhere left to expand. The independent Republic of Texas prevented expansion west of Louisiana, while the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery initiatives north of the 36°30' parallel. Faced with this reality, Southern leaders pressured the Democrat-controlled government to expand the nation. Under the guise of "manifest destiny," the U.S. sought to purchase New Mexico and California from Mexico in 1845. When Mexico refused to sell its territories, the U.S. declared war, emerged victorious, and received the land in accordance with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron 1959).

With the new territories in hand, the conditions for balance seemed to have been restored. Instead, sectional divisions emerged and party unity began disintegrating. In 1846, David Wilmot (D-PA) sponsored legislation to ban slavery in the newly acquired territories. Wilmot and other Northerners felt that the South was wielding too much power over the national agenda and needed to be stopped (Foner 1995; Potter 1976). After a lengthy battle, the Wilmot Proviso passed in the House but was rejected in the Senate. The sectional divisions piqued by Wilmot worsened, however, and required a definitive resolution four years later, in the Compromise of 1850. This settlement included the legal extension of slavery into the former Mexican territories and the adoption of stricter fugitive slave laws, as well as the admission of California as a free state and the abolishment of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.

The Further Extension of Slavery
and the End of the Second Party System

Despite acquiring slavery rights in the former Mexican territories, Southern leaders were still dissatisfied, for two reasons. First, the arid lands of New Mexico were not conducive to slave-intensive agriculture and, thus, were unlikely to be settled by slavery proponents (Weingast 1998, 156).[2] Second, with the admittance of California as a free state, the anti-slavery forces had achieved a one-state advantage in the Senate. Given these constraints, Southern leaders saw only one way to protect their economic way of life: settlement north of the 36°30' parallel.

After capturing both chambers of Congress as well as the presidency in 1852, the Democrats made their move. Led by Senator Stephen A. Douglas (D-IL), a coalition proposed legislation to repeal the Missouri Compromise. This legislation, which became the Kansas-Nebraska Act, provided for self-determination in the territories north of the 36°30' parallel. By nature of "popular sovereignty," each territory would decide its own slavery status (Hofstadter, Miller, and Aaron 1959). Behind a near-unanimous contingent of Democrats and Whigs from the South, along with a group of Northern Democrats, the measure was passed into law—but not without costs.[3] Already damaged by the Compromise of 1850, the Whig Party was left hopelessly divided, and serious rifts also appeared in the Democratic coalition, as their northern wing split into pro-Nebraska and anti-Nebraska camps (Gienapp 1987; Holt 1978; Potter 1976).

The Rise of Legitimate Opposition

Amid the fallout from the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a growing nativist movement spread through the nation in response to a large influx of immigrants (principally Catholics) from Ireland and Germany. Nativism combined with anti-slavery sentiment in the North to produce a dynamic and divisive electoral environment in 1854. With the weakening of the traditional two-party system after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a new series of candidates emerged and campaigned on combinations of anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic, and anti-slavery tenets (Anbinder 1992; Billington 1938). This new group won a majority of the congressional races in 1854–55, driving the Whigs into extinction and reducing the Democrats to minority status.[4]

This new majority was composed of two types: Know-Nothings and Republicans. The Know-Nothings (or American Party, as they later called themselves) were a mysterious, decentralized organization claiming adherents in both the North and South. While they supported anti-slavery tenets (in the North), Know-Nothings were concerned primarily with nativism, using anti-slavery slogans merely as a means to win election (Anbinder 1992; Billington 1938). The Republicans, on the other hand, were a sectional party composed of former Free-Soil Democrats and Whigs from the North. They organized formally around the issue of slavery but also appealed to nativist contingents, at times, to secure victory (Foner 1995; Gienapp 1987; Sewell 1976).

In many cases, primarily in the North, individual candidates were elected on "fusion" tickets after receiving the endorsement of more than one political organization (Martis 1989). Both the Know-Nothings and the Republicans endeavored to elect candidates who adhered to their particular tenets; however, neither cared whether these same candidates adhered to the tenets of the other group as well. Stated another way, each group viewed fusion as a means of increasing its own likelihood of electoral success (Aldrich 1995; Anbinder 1992; Potter 1976).

The fusion movement, along with the secret nature of the Know-Nothing society, made it difficult to identify clear partisan attachments for new House members. The *Congressional Globe*, which traditionally listed party labels for MCs at the opening of each session, failed to do so for the 34th House, and historians' attempts at party identification have not produced a consistent view.[5] This muddled state of affairs is summarized nicely by Mayer (1967, 30): "When the votes were counted . . . the Democrats knew that they had lost, but nobody knew who had won." Thus, when the 34th House convened in November 1855, a distinct working majority did not exist on *partisan*

grounds. As such, a nonpartisan issue like slavery appeared to hold the speakership election in the balance (Anbinder 1992; Gienapp 1987; Harrington 1939).

III. The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Common-Space Estimation

To analyze the speakership election of 1855–56, we apply the spatial theory of voting to the individual balloting.[6] We construct a sincere, spatial voting model to predict MCs' vote choices and compare those predictions to their actual vote choices. This allows us to investigate how MCs' ideological (spatial) preferences affected their selections of candidates.

Because we adhere to "classical" spatial voting theory in this analysis, we are concerned *only* with the spatial positions of MCs and speakership candidates and do not incorporate other factors that may influence vote choice. Predicting sincere spatial behavior then becomes straightforward (deterministic), boiling down to measuring distances between MC and candidate ideal points. Under an assumption of complete information, in which the respective locations of the candidates and MCs are known by all with certainty, a sincere voter casts his vote for that candidate who is closest to his own ideal point.

To conduct our analysis, we first needed to locate ideal points for MCs and speakership candidates in some common evaluative space. To this end, we adopted the "ideological" space and member coordinates (NOMINATE scores) developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997). However, NOMINATE scores are based on the revealed preferences of MCs on *common* sets of recorded roll-call votes, which presents a problem for our analysis, as the eventual winner of the speakership race in the 34th House, Nathaniel Banks, typically did not vote while serving as speaker. Thus, a NOMINATE estimate for Banks in the 34th House does not exist, preventing us from placing a complete set of speakership candidates in the relevant ideological space.

To resolve this problem, we rely on an innovation developed by Poole (1998) that generates a single set of ideal-point estimates for each member serving in a given *set* of congresses and places them in a common evaluative space. The procedure involves pooling the scores of members who served a threshold number of Congresses (in the House or the Senate, but preferably in both) to form an unbalanced panel, which is then used to estimate the best-fitting *average* coordinates for

the other MCs over the relevant time span. Because Banks served in the 33d Congress as an ordinary member, Poole's procedure generates a common-space coordinate for him, as well as the other speakership candidates, thus eliminating our problem.

Ideal points were generated for all members who served from the 33d Congress (1853–55) through the 37th Congress (1861–63), with the threshold number of Congresses-served set at four. There were 872 MCs during this period, of whom 58 served in either four or five Congresses (24 House only, 14 Senate only, 20 both); these were the basis of the scaling. To estimate common-space coordinates for the other 814 members, we ran a simple OLS regression to find the mappings from the 58 common-space members into the original W-NOMINATE coordinates. The common-space coordinates for each of the 814 is the mean of their transformed W-NOMINATE coordinates. In order for the common-space estimates to make sense, however, we must assume that members maintain consistent ideologies throughout the Congresses being scaled, including changes from one chamber to the other.

A potential problem exists if the underlying W-NOMINATE scores fit the data poorly. If so, then the common-space estimation may produce ideal points that do not reliably measure MCs' actual interests. While this is a genuine concern, it is unwarranted in this case, as Poole and Rosenthal (1997) report that the spatial model fit the observed data well during this period. The 34th Congress, in particular, was a very solid fit: the first-dimension W-NOMINATE scores correctly classified about 85.8% of members' votes in the House.[7] In addition, the common-space transformations provide a superb fit to the underlying W-NOMINATE scores for the five Congresses in question: the R-square statistic for the mapping of the common-space coordinate subset into the W-NOMINATE scores was 0.96 for the first dimension.[8] Correlations between members' first-dimension W-NOMINATE scores and their common-space scores were 0.975, 0.982, 0.993, 0.992, and 0.927 for the 33d through the 37th Houses, respectively.

Two results emerge from these findings. First, the exceptional fit between the underlying W-NOMINATE scores and the common-space scores suggests that the maintained hypothesis of stable ideological locations for MCs is credible for this era.[9] Thus, using MCs' voting records after the 34th Congress, in part, to generate common-space scores for the 34th Congress does not present any major problems, since the ideological orderings remain remarkably consistent from the 33d through the 37th Congresses. Second, the exceptional fit also has a particular, substantive appeal. Poole and Rosenthal (1997,

41) identify their first dimension from the 33d to the 37th Congresses as a *slavery dimension*. This claim is borne out by comparing members' first-dimension common-space scores to their scores on an index of slavery votes from the 34th Congress: a high correlation ($r = 0.953$) exists between the two sets of coordinates.[10] Thus, we can use members' first-dimension common-space scores to determine how influential their ideological positions on slavery were in determining their votes for speaker.[11]

Finally, we wish to emphasize that endogeneity issues do not plague our analysis.[12] Because none of the 133 votes for speaker were binary in nature, they were not included in the NOMINATE estimation. Consequently, the dependent variable (a given speakership vote) is not merely a function of the independent variable (spatial ideology) in our model, thereby increasing our confidence in the reliability and validity of our subsequent empirical findings.

IV. The House Election for Speaker, 1855–56

Before turning to a spatial analysis of the speakership election, we first discuss some of the developments that occurred before the balloting started, specifically what strategies each of the parties developed (or failed to develop) to win the contest.

Election Preliminaries

Before the 34th Congress, neither the Republicans nor the Know-Nothings were well-organized coalitions. Each group, however, made attempts to unify. In June 1855, the Know-Nothings assembled to establish a national party platform and a fourteen-section creed was drafted to clarify the group's positions. Few delegates objected to the first eleven sections, which dealt specifically with issues of nativism, but a major dispute arose around the twelfth section, which dealt with slavery. The leadership's position was to "abide by and maintain the existing laws upon the subject of slavery, as a final and conclusive settlement of that subject," thus implicitly accepting the provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.[13] Many Northern members who were elected in part on anti-slavery rhetoric rejected this plank and called for the reestablishment of the Missouri Compromise; however, they were outnumbered by their pro-slavery brethren (Anbinder 1992, 67–72). Rather than accept the pro-slavery plank, the anti-slavery delegates walked out of the convention, thereby crippling attempts to nationalize the organization (Harrington 1939, 188; Van Horne 1967, 209).

The Republicans also had a difficult time organizing. Republican leaders believed the House to be composed of a majority of anti-slavery representatives and decided to frame the upcoming speakership election as a ratification or rejection of the "Slave Power," as expressed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. In an attempt to marshal the anti-slavery forces, they called for a party caucus to select a suitable Republican (anti-slavery) candidate. Their call, however, went largely unanswered, as fewer than half of those MCs opposed to the extension of slavery attended the caucus (Harrington 1939, 188–89; Hollcroft 1956, 445; Silbey 1989, 5–7).

The Democrats selected William A. Richardson from Illinois as their speakership candidate. Richardson was the party's "point-man" in the House on the Kansas-Nebraska legislation in 1854 and thus was viewed as an optimal choice: he was a staunch supporter of slavery extension, which appealed to Southern Democrats, as well as a close associate of many Northern Democrats (Gienapp 1987, 244; Harrington 1939, 190). Democratic leaders also saw the splintering of the Know-Nothings (KNs) as a potential windfall. They believed that Southern KNs would not vote for an anti-slavery candidate and tried to coerce them into supporting Richardson. Their attempt, however, was ill-conceived, as the Democratic nominating caucus denounced the Know-Nothing organization and demanded that Southern KNs "surrender, lock, stock, and barrel" but offered them nothing in return for their allegiance (Overdyke 1968, 164).

Spatial Voting Analysis

When the 34th House convened on December 3, 1855, four can-didates for speaker had already emerged from the anti-administration assemblage. Two individuals, Nathaniel Banks (MA) and Lewis D. Campbell (OH), represented the anti-slavery contingent. Banks, a former Whig, Free Soiler, and Know-Nothing, was considered to be a "passionate anti-slavery man" (Niven 1973, 265) but also a blatant opportunist who switched allegiances when opportunities for personal gain materialized (Gienapp 1987, 242–43). Campbell was a former Whig and Know-Nothing who left the KN party after the adoption of section twelve. Conceited and caustic, he was considered by many to be the most anti-slavery of all of the candidates (Gienapp 1987, 242; Van Horne 1967, 209–12). Two individuals also represented the Know-Nothing contingent: Humphrey Marshall (KY), a former Whig, and Henry M. Fuller (PA), a defender of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (Harrington 1939, 198–99).

FIGURE 1
Two-Dimensional Spatial Distribution of Members,
34th House

First-Dimension Common-Space NOMINATE Score

The two-dimensional spatial positions of the five speakership candidates, as well as the House membership, are presented in Figure 1. Using the first dimension to represent slavery preferences, the spatial locations are quite consistent with the historical accounts: Richardson (−0.315) is far to the left (the pro-slavery range), Banks (0.258) and Campbell (0.324) are far to the right (the anti-slavery range)—with Campbell further to the right of Banks—and Marshall (−0.039) and Fuller (−0.071) are near the center but closer to the Democratic (pro-slavery) position.

We begin our analysis by investigating the opening ballot for speaker on December 3, 1855, in which Richardson received the most votes, 74, but fell 39 votes short of a majority.[14] We find that a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 119 of the 220 votes cast, or 54%.[15] Of the 101 errors, however, 25 were cases of MCs voting for individuals *other* than the five major speaker candidates. Analyzing only those votes cast for Banks, Campbell, Fuller, Marshall, and Richardson, we find that a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 119 of the 195 votes, or 61%. Of those 76 spatial errors, 43 were due to MCs choosing a different candidate *within the same*

coalition, i.e., predicted-Banks voters selecting Campbell, predicted-Campbell voters selecting Banks, predicted-Fuller voters selecting Marshall, or predicted-Marshall voters selecting Fuller.

To this point, we have portrayed slavery as the overriding concern of all parties at the outset of the speakership battle. Yet, nativism was instrumental to the electoral emergence of the Know-Nothings and partly responsible, through fusion, to the electoral emergence of the Republicans. To determine whether nativism also affected members' vote choices for speaker, we incorporate an additional dimension of analysis to tap nativist sentiment. Poole and Rosenthal (1993, 21–22) contend that their second-dimension NOMINATE score, while weak relative to the first dimension, "appears to capture the nativist sentiment of the time, because it tends to separate members of the American [Know-Nothing] Party from the rest of the House." Looking again at only those votes cast for the five major speaker candidates, we find that the two-dimensional spatial model, rather than improve classification, actually worsens the fit: only 72 of the 195 votes, or 36.9%, on the first ballot are correctly classified.

After the initial deadlock on the first ballot, voting continued over the course of the week without producing a majority winner (see Appendix beginning on page 126 for individual ballot outcomes). On December 5, Marshall took his name out of consideration, which left the Southern Know-Nothings, after scattering their votes for several ballots, to coalesce around Fuller, the only major Know-Nothing candidate left in the race (Harrington 1939, 194; Lientz 1978, 84–85). On the evening of December 6, the anti-slavery contingent organized a caucus and agreed to settle on Banks as their sole candidate, leaving Campbell to withdraw from the race the following day (Harrington 1939, 192–93; Hollcroft 1956, 449).[16] Thus, four days into the contest, only three viable candidates remained in the field: Richardson, Banks, and Fuller.

A host of ballots was taken the following week, without producing a majority winner—although Banks was consistently about six votes shy of election. As there was very little variance in the distribution of votes (see Appendix), we simply look at one ballot, the 51st, which is typical of the lot: Banks received 105 votes, Richardson tallied 75 votes, and Fuller collected 33 votes. Their spatial positions on the first dimension, as well as the distribution of the House membership, are presented in Figure 2. We find that a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 193 of the 222 votes cast, or 86.9%. Of the 29 errors, nine are attributable to MCs voting for individuals other than the three major speaker candidates.[17] If we ignore those nine "scatters" and focus only on votes for Banks, Fuller, and Richardson, the one-

FIGURE 2
One-Dimensional Spatial Distribution of Members,
34th House

First-Dimension Common-Space NOMINATE Score

dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 193 of the 213 votes cast, or 90.6%. Of those 20 spatial errors, only *two* were either predicted-Banks voters selecting Richardson or predicted-Richardson voters selecting Banks. Stated another way, only two votes were inconsistent with spatial preferences, as most of the errors were near the two cut-points between the three candidates: predicted-Fuller voters selecting Richardson, predicted-Richardson voters selecting Fuller, predicted-Fuller voters selecting Banks, or predicted-Banks voters selecting Fuller.

Incorporating a second dimension once again fails to improve the fit. Looking again at only those votes cast for the three major speaker candidates, the two-dimensional model correctly classifies 184 of the 213 votes cast, or 86.4%, which is a 4.2% (or nine vote) falloff from the one-dimensional model. In addition, the two-dimensional model performs poorly in *precisely* the domain that we would have expected it to improve classification, that is, with Fuller voters. Of the 33 MCs who voted for Fuller, only 18 are predicted correctly by the one-dimensional model. Presumably, the addition of a dimension to account for nativism would better explain Fuller voters, yet this is not the case.

The two-dimensional model correctly classifies only 10 of the 33 MCs who voted for Fuller, an eight-vote reduction from the one-dimensional model. These results, along with the results from the first ballot, suggest that nativism had little or no effect on the speakership election but rather that the slavery issue, by itself, was the driving force behind members' vote choices.

By the middle of November, the parties' preference profiles were well established. Both the Republicans and the Know-Nothings most preferred to elect their own candidate. If that could not be achieved, both preferred to maintain the electoral gridlock (their second most preferred outcome) and prevent the House from organizing: each party's continued existence was at stake, and a wholesale concession could have been fatal (Silbey 1989, 4–7).[18] Leaders on both sides also felt that the incumbent Democratic administration stood to lose more from an unorganized House; thus, each would gain in relative terms (Hollcroft 1956, 452). In addition, if both Republicans and Know-Nothings believed that members of the other two parties would continue to vote sincerely, then each could continue casting ballots for their most preferred alternative and guarantee their second-best outcome (given that each group was pivotal).

The Democrats also wanted to elect their candidate, but, unlike the other parties, they could not tolerate a lengthy gridlock. Since they controlled the presidency and the Senate, they were anxious to pursue a partisan agenda. If their first choice was unattainable, they preferred to have either a Republican- or Know-Nothing-controlled House rather than an unorganized one; from their established position, vote trades and compromises were better than no legislative outputs at all. However, they also felt that the Know-Nothing and Republican organizations were "shaky" and would not survive for long. Thus, they were torn by conflicting pressures: settle now and guarantee a moderate stream of policy outputs, or settle later and receive a "lottery" payoff (a possible unorganized House and no policy outputs, or a possible unified Democratic organization, after one of the other parties collapsed, and a large stream of policy outputs). Based on actual events, the Democrats appear to have chosen the lottery, believing, it seems, that the likelihood of a collapse was high enough to warrant playing the risky strategy.

The Democrats underestimated their adversaries' resolve. The balloting continued through the rest of December 1855 and into January 1856 with little change in the relative positions of the candidates (see Appendix).[19] By the end of January, the Democrats had updated their beliefs: the Know-Nothings and Republicans were holding fast, the

Pierce administration once content with an extended struggle was growing frustrated with the deadlock, and an unorganized House was becoming a distinct possibility (Harrington 1939, 197–200).[20] Thus, with little expected payoff from further delay, they determined to end the contest quickly.

Finally, under the leadership of Alexander H. Stephens (D-GA), the Democrats devised a plan to bring the contest to a head.[21] During the previous weeks, the Republicans had attempted to enact a rules change—moving from majority rule to plurality rule—in order to end the contest but had fallen short because Democrats and Know-Nothings believed it would produce a Republican victory.[22] Now, Stephens planned to use the plurality rule *against* the Republicans. First, he persuaded several Democrats to switch their votes to support the plurality rule, thereby insuring its passage. Second, he planned to nominate a new Democratic candidate for speaker, William Aiken of South Carolina.[23] Aiken was a strategic choice because he had not attended the Democratic caucus that denounced the Know-Nothing organization and, thus, could be portrayed as unprejudiced against the particular needs of Know-Nothings (Schott 1988, 193). Moreover, he was a loyal Democrat and distinct proponent of slavery, owning over 100 slaves.

Stephens felt that the ploy would be successful: "From my knowledge of the House, its present tone and temper, knowledge of Aiken and the estimation he was held in by several scatterers, I believed he would beat Banks. . . . I sounded out some of the Western Know-Nothings—Marshall and others—and found that they could be brought into it."[24] Stephens believed the passage of the plurality rule would eliminate Fuller as a viable candidate, given that he was running a distant third, and force the Know-Nothings to choose between Aiken and Banks. He hoped that his token gestures to the KNs, along with his knowledge of their pro-slavery preferences, would provide Aiken with a sufficient number of votes to edge Banks.[25]

In accordance with Stephens's plan, on February 2, a new plurality rule was proposed and passed, 113 to 104, as nine Democrats switched and supported the motion (Harrington 1939, 201).[26] Stephens then introduced Aiken as the new Democratic candidate, setting the stage for an electoral showdown. The specifics of the rule provided that three additional majority-rule ballots be held before a plurality vote was taken. Over the course of these three votes, 21 of Fuller's 34 supporters defected to Aiken: all 21 of these MCs were closer to Aiken than to Banks in a one-dimensional spatial analysis. Thus, on the eve of the 133d and final ballot, Banks stood at 102 votes, Aiken at 93, and Fuller at 13, with six MCs scattering their votes.[27]

To Stephens's chagrin, Banks edged Aiken 103 to 100 in the plurality vote, with 11 votes scattering.[28] Aiken was able to pick up seven more of Fuller's former supporters, but six MCs continued to select Fuller, despite his exit from the race.[29] We find that a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 198 of the 214 votes cast, or 92.5%.[30] Of the 16 spatial errors, however, 11 are attributable to MCs voting for individuals other than Aiken or Banks. Focusing only on those MCs who voted for either Aiken or Banks, we find that their spatial positions on the slavery issue predicted their final tallies for Speaker nearly perfectly: a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 198 of the 203 votes, or 98.5%. Only five errors are uncovered, and all are of the predicted-Banks-but-selecting-Aiken variety. As in previous ballots, the addition of a second dimension leads to a poorer spatial fit: only 170 of the 203 votes (83.7%) cast for Aiken or Banks are classified correctly.

To further evaluate our unidimensional spatial model's performance, we compare it to a simple baseline: a regional model in which MCs from slave states vote for Aiken while MCs from free states vote for Banks. The regional model performs quite well, correctly predicting 185 of the 203 votes, or 91.1%. The unidimensional spatial model, however, improves the fit considerably, as measured by the proportional reduction in error (PRE) between the two models (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 29–30).[31] The PRE is $(18-5)/18 = 0.722$, indicating that the spatial model provides a 72.2% improvement in fit over the regional (baseline) model. The use of ideology, then, substantially improves classification because it picks up members from free states who supported slavery—a dynamic not captured by a regional model.[32]

To summarize, we find that members' ideological positions on the issue of slavery were an excellent predictor of their vote choices in the speakership election of 1855–56. The effects of slavery were considerable from the outset, even in multiple candidate rounds, and proved to be more influential as the balloting progressed (and the set of candidates became smaller). While nativism may have influenced elections to the 34th House and would continue to affect the Republicans' electoral fortunes for several more years, we found *no* evidence that it influenced members' vote choices for Speaker. Indeed, when a second dimension of analysis was included to account for nativism, fewer votes were correctly classified.

V. Institutional Consolidation:
The Organization of the 34th House and Beyond

To support our spatial results, we investigate Banks's actions as Speaker in the 34th House as well as the Republican Party's ideological makeup through the Civil War. If the Republican Party truly began as an ideological coalition, we would expect Banks to have organized the House in an ideological fashion around anti-slavery tenets. Additionally, if the initial ideological coalition evolved into a *partisan* coalition, we would expect Republicans in subsequent Congresses to have remained quite ideologically stable along the slavery dimension (the NOMINATE first dimension).

The Organization of the 34th House

If Banks indeed organized the chamber around anti-slavery tenets, we contend that he should have awarded committee chairmanships to his supporters. Chairs had tremendous powers over the policy agenda *within* committees; any policies not conducive to a chair's tastes would not be debated. We would also expect Banks to have stacked committees with his supporters, especially important policy committees, thereby increasing the likelihood that an anti-slavery agenda would be advanced.

Our contentions clash with those of Silbey (1989), who argues that Banks could not organize the House effectively because he had too many factions to placate. Consequently, Banks was forced to balance competing interests, which prevented him from building an anti-slavery coalition. To support his thesis, Silbey claims that Banks appointed a significant number of non-Republicans to committee chairs. By Silbey's count, only 11 Republicans received chairmanships, while the other 26 chairs were divided among Whigs, Know-Nothings, Democrats, and various hybrids. Based on these figures, Silbey (1989, 11) claims: "The final distribution of committee chairmanships . . . hardly reflected secure Republican hegemony."

We contend that Silbey's use of partisan labels to make such a claim is suspect. As mentioned previously, partisan-affiliation data for anti-administration MCs during this period was far from reliable, given the fluid nature of fusion-based politics. Because we argue that the Republican Party began as an ideological coalition, we contend that members' votes for speaker and their common-space NOMINATE scores are more reliable measures of partisanship.

Examining members' votes on the last speakership ballot, we find that Banks disproportionately appointed *allies* to committee chairs.

TABLE 1
Spatial Location of House Chairmen, 34th House

Chairman	State	Committee	NOMINATE Score	Speaker Vote	Banks Supporter
William Kelsey	NY	Engraving	0.509	Banks	Yes
Edwin Morgan	NY	Patents	0.503	Banks	Yes
George Simmons	NY	Judiciary	0.483	Banks	Yes
Samuel Benson	ME	Naval Affairs	0.479	Banks	Yes
Aaron Cragin	NY	Expenditures in the War Dept.	0.479	Banks	Yes
David Holloway	IN	Agriculture	0.473	Banks	Yes
Israel Washburn	ME	Elections	0.469	Banks	Yes
Alvah Sabin	VT	Revisal and Unfinished Business	0.468	Banks	Yes
James Pike	NH	Joint Committee on Enrolled Bills	0.459	Banks	Yes
Ezra Clark	CT	Manufactures	0.457	Banks	Yes
Sidney Dean	CT	Public Expenditures	0.440	Banks	Yes
Benjamin Pringle	NY	Indian Affairs	0.438	Banks	Yes
Henry Bennett	NY	Public Lands	0.414	Banks	Yes
Elihu Wasburne	IL	Commerce	0.410	Banks	Yes
Alexander Pennington	NJ	Foreign Affairs	0.410	Banks	Yes
James Knox	IL	Roads and Canals	0.394	Banks	Yes
Joshua Giddings	OH	Claims	0.384	Banks	Yes
James Meacham	VT	District of Columbia	0.384	Banks	Yes
Galusha Grow	PA	Territories	0.380	Banks	Yes
Henry Waldron	MI	Expenditures in the Treasury Dept.	0.376	Banks	Yes
John Petit	IN	Expenditures in the Post Office	0.342	Banks	Yes
David Ritchie	PA	Revolutionary Claims	0.329	Banks	Yes
Lewis Campbell	OH	Ways and Means	0.324	Banks	Yes
Edward Ball	OH	Public Buildings and Grounds	0.322	Banks	Yes
John Kunkel	PA	Militia	0.255	Banks	Yes
Benjamin Thurston	RI	Accounts	0.241	Banks	Yes
Daniel Mace	IN	Post Office and Post Roads	0.237	Banks	Yes
Andrew Oliver	NY	Invalid Pensions	0.212	Banks	Yes
Matthias Nichols	OH	Joint Committee on Printing	0.121	Banks	Yes
Jacob Broom	PA	Revolutionary Pensions	-0.030	Fuller	Yes
Gilchrist Porter	MO	Private Land Claims	-0.119	Aiken	No
Thomas Harris	IL	Expenditures in the Navy Dept.	-0.202	Aiken	No
William Sneed	TN	Mileage	-0.274	Aiken	No
William Aiken	SC	Joint Committee on Library	-0.357	***	No
John Quitman	MS	Military Affairs	-0.377	Aiken	No
Preston Brooks	SC	Expenditures in the State Dept.	-0.389	Aiken	No
Fayette McMullen	VA	Expenditures on Public Buildings	-0.464	Aiken	No

Note: NOMINATE Score: Location of chair's ideal point on the first-dimension common-space NOMINATE scale. Speaker Vote: Member's vote for speaker on the final (plurality-rule) ballot. Banks Supporter: Whether a member's ideal point was closer to Banks than to Aiken.

As Table 1 indicates, 29 of 37 committees were chaired by Banks voters, which implies that committees were much more reflective of Banks and the emerging Republican Party than Silbey contends.[33] An examination based on common-space NOMINATE scores supports these findings. As Table 1 suggests, in 24 of 37 cases the chair's ideal point was actually *to the right of Banks* (0.258), suggesting that *strongly* anti-slavery members were given committee leadership roles. In all, 30 of 37 chairs went to members closer ideologically to Banks than to Aiken, labeled "Banks supporters" in the table. Furthermore, results from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirm that the median common-space NOMINATE score for committee chairs was greater (i.e., more anti-slavery) than the median score of the House ($z = 3.75, p < 0.0001$).

In addition to his claims regarding chairs, Silbey (1989, 12–13) argues that Banks appointed non-Republican majorities to important committees. He identifies eight key policy committees—Ways and Means, Commerce, Public Lands, Judiciary, Manufactures, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Territories—and contends that *none* of them possessed a Republican majority. Data presented in Table 2 contradict these findings. First, we find Banks-voting majorities on six of the eight committees. Moreover, using common-space NOMINATE scores, we find pro-Banks ideological majorities on *all* eight committees. In all, Banks-supporters comprised majorities on 29 of the 37 standing committees in the 34th House.

The Emergence of the Republican Party

To what degree did the ideological coalition that elected Banks become a partisan coalition in succeeding Congresses? We can examine this question *electorally* by looking at partisan labels for that subset of members who voted for Banks and ran for reelection to the 35th House. During the course of the 34th House, anti-administration MCs "sorted" themselves out (into Republicans and Know-Nothings), making partisan labels as electoral heuristics meaningful once again. Of the 103 Banks voters on the final speakership ballot, 72 ran for reelection to the 35th House. Of those 72, *69* ran as Republicans (Dubin 1998, 176–81), indicating the near complete migration of Banks voters into the Republican ranks.

We can also examine the question of ideological-partisan development *institutionally*, by comparing the spatial location of the Banks coalition in the 34th House with the spatial location of Republicans in the 35th, 36th, and 37th Houses, using the first-dimension D-NOMINATE score as the common metric. If the Republican Party truly began as an

TABLE 2
Standing Committee Composition, 34th House

Committee	Committee Median	Banks Voters	Banks Supporters	Total Members
Joint Committee on Printing	0.465	3	3	3
Revisal and Unfinished Business	0.457	3	3	5
Judiciary[a]	0.410	4	5	9
Engraving	0.401	2	2	3
Territories[a]	0.380	6	6	9
District of Columbia	0.379	5	6	9
Public Lands[a]	0.337	5	5	9
Patents	0.330	3	3	5
Revolutionary Claims	0.329	4	5	9
Agriculture[a]	0.324	5	5	9
Ways and Means[a]	0.308	5	6	9
Military Affairs	0.282	5	5	9
Elections	0.262	5	6	9
Foreign Affairs[a]	0.241	5	5	9
Public Expenditures	0.238	5	5	9
Public Buildings and Grounds	0.223	3	3	5
Expenditures on Public Buildings	0.223	1	1	5
Invalid Pensions	0.212	5	5	9
Indian Affairs	0.204	5	5	9
Manufactures[a]	0.150	4	5	9
Post Office and Post Roads	0.145	5	6	9
Naval Affairs	0.145	3	5	9
Accounts	0.121	3	3	5
Roads and Canals	0.024	2	5	9
Claims	0.019	4	5	9
Private Land Claims	0.010	3	5	9
Commerce[a]	0.009	5	5	9
Joint Committee on Library	0.009	2	2	3
Expenditures in the Treasury Dept.	0.007	2	3	5
Revolutionary Pensions	-0.030	4	5	9
Militia	-0.062	3	4	9
Expenditures in the War Dept.	-0.101	2	2	5
Expenditures in the Navy Dept.	-0.124	1	2	5
Expenditures in the Post Office	-0.129	1	1	5
Joint Committee on Enrolled Bills	-0.208	1	1	3
Mileage	-0.229	2	2	5
Expenditures in the State Dept.	-0.295	2	2	5

[a]Silbey's (1989) "key" policy committees
Note: Committee Median: First-dimension common-space NOMINATE score for the median member of the committee. Banks Voters: Number of members on committee who voted for Banks on the last ballot. Banks Supporters: Number of members on committee whose ideal points were closer to Banks than to Aiken. Total Members: Total number of members on committee.

FIGURE 3
Kernel Density Plots of Banks Coalition and Republican Party

Note: The plot for the 34th Congress represents the Banks Coalition. Plots for the 35th through 37th Congresses represent the Republican Party.

ideological coalition, organized around anti-slavery tenets, then the spatial location of Banks voters in the 34th House should correspond well to the spatial location of Republicans in succeeding Congresses. Density plots for the Banks coalition (34th House) and the Republican Party (35th through 37th Houses) appear in Figure 3. As the plots indicate, the Banks coalition and the three sets of Republicans overlap nicely on the right side (anti-slavery end) of the D-NOMINATE spectrum. Summary statistics, which appear in Table 3, tell a similar story. Results from means and variance tests (t and F tests) indicate that there are no significant differences between (a) the Banks coalition and any of the sets of Republicans and (b) any two sets of Republicans. These results suggest that the ideological coalition that selected Banks for Speaker in the 34th House and the Republican Party of the 35th through 37th Houses occupied the same space along the slavery dimension. Thus, what began simply as an ideological coalition became a partisan coalition that was organized along ideological lines.

TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Banks Coalition and Republican Party

House	Number of Members	Mean D-NOMINATE Score	Standard Deviation
34th House	103	0.444	0.113
35th House	92	0.436	0.107
36th House	118	0.408	0.121
37th House	107	0.408	0.108

Note: Figures for 34th House represent the Banks coalition. Figures for 35th through 37th Houses represent Republican Party.

True to our expectations, we find that Banks used his powers as Speaker to organize the House in an ideological fashion, as both committee chair appointments and committee majorities were skewed toward the anti-slavery position. Silbey's results, we argue, place too much emphasis on party labels at a time when partisanship was extremely fluid. Because the Republican Party initially began as an issue-based coalition (an anti-slavery group), we contend that measures of revealed preferences—speakership votes and spatial ideology—provide a more reliable means to study its institutional consolidation. In addition, using partisan affiliation data and density plots, we find that Banks voters were not simply a transitory group of members who happened to vote together on the final speakership ballot. Rather, they staked an ideological claim in the 34th House that they continued to mine in the 35th, 36th, and 37th Houses as part of the Republican Party.

VI. Conclusion

Our purpose in this paper has been to investigate the institutional origins of the Republican Party. We focus on a critical event, the House speakership election of 1855, which lasted through two months and 133 ballots. In the end, a Republican, Nathaniel Banks, was elected, producing the first major victory for the new party. Using the spatial theory of voting and scaling techniques developed by Poole (1998), we find that vote choice from the outset of the speaker's race can be explained largely by a unidimensional spatial model, one in which slavery represents the substantive issue dimension. We find that adding

a second dimension to account for nativism, which was an important issue in Republican successes in the congressional elections of 1854–55, provided no additional leverage in explaining members' vote choices for speaker. Moving beyond the speakership contest, we investigate the organization of the 34th House and find that Banks, once elected Speaker, organized the standing committee system around anti-slavery tenets. An overwhelming majority of both committee chairs and committees—especially the key policy committees—were populated by anti-slavery MCs. Moreover, we uncover evidence to connect Banks's ideological coalition to the emerging Republican Party. We find that members of the Banks coalition who ran for reelection to the 35th House did so almost unanimously as Republicans. In addition, Banks' coalition established an ideological agenda in the 34th House that the Republicans would perpetuate in subsequent Houses.

We contend that these results shed new light on the institutional origins of the Republican Party. Historians contend that nativism was intertwined with the Republicans' electoral fortunes deep into the 1850s and that candidates balanced the competing interests of slavery and nativism in order to win election. Nativism, as a tenet of Republican orthodoxy, finally ended in 1860 with the presidential nomination of Abraham Lincoln, who stated: "I have some little notoriety for com-miserating the oppressed condition of the Negro; and I should be strangely inconsistent if I could favor any project for curtailing the rights of *white* men, even though born in different lands, and speaking different languages from myself."[34]

Despite its being an electoral force until 1860, results from our spatial model suggest that nativism played *no* part in members' vote choices during the speakership election of 1855–56. We find that slavery was the *only* determinant of (a) the speakership contest, (b) Banks's organization of the 34th House, and (c) the institutional basis of the Republican Party in succeeding Congresses. Thus, while the Republicans may have struggled for an *electoral* identity for several more years, as historians contend, we find that they emerged as a distinct, single-issue, anti-slavery group at the *institutional* level as early as 1855.

Our results also have broader implications for the study of Congress in the decade preceding the Civil War. Because of the fluid nature of politics after the collapse of the Whig Party and before the rise of the Republican Party, we believe that explanations based on party labels are ultimately problematic. The appearance of crosscutting issues, like slavery, confound traditional notions of partisanship and require a more reliable measure to study Congressional vote choice.

We argue that ideological measures, specifically measures of revealed preference like speakership votes and spatial-voting estimates, better capture the issue-based nature of the politics of the time.

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NOTES

1. For a survey, see Aldrich 1995; Brady 1988; Fogel 1992; Foner 1995; Gienapp 1987; Holt 1978; Potter 1976; Riker 1982; Sewell 1976; Sundquist 1983; Weingast 1991, 1998.

2. Although, for an alternative view, see Sewell 1976.

3. The vote was 37 to 14 in the Senate and 113 to 100 in the House (*Congressional Globe*, 33–1, pp. 532, 1254).

4. Before 1880, some states held general House elections in odd-numbered years.

5. The *Tribune Almanac* (1856, p. 3) identifies 79 Democrats, 37 Southern Whigs, and 117 Oppositions "of all shades," which included Know-Nothings, Free-Soil Democrats, and at least 34 Republicans. The Richmond *Enquirer* (November 27, 1855) lists 83 Democrats, 77 Whigs, and 73 Know-Nothings. Nevins (1947, 413–14) identifies 83 Democrats, 43 Know-Nothings, and 108 Republicans. Martis (1989, 33–34) lists 83 Democrats, 51 Know-Nothings, and 100 Oppositions. Anbinder (1992, 197 fn 8) identifies 123 of the 234 MCs as having belonged at one time to a Know-Nothing lodge. Finally, Dubin (1998, 174) lists 81 Democrats, 55 Whigs, 52 Know-Nothings, 22 Anti-Nebraskans, 13 Republicans, and 11 others.

6. Spatial voting theory assumes that a voter can rank order the elements in a set of alternatives (given some preference function) and then choose the element that ranks highest on his list. We assume that each MC's preferences can be described by a utility function that meets certain restrictions, such that on each dimension each member has single-peaked preferences. See Enelow and Hinich 1984, and Hinich and Munger 1994, 1997 for more details.

7. Poole, personal communication, October 22, 1997.

8. Poole, personal communication, September 24, 1997. The fit for the second dimension was a more modest 0.6.

9. In fact, the fit is even better than in the contemporary period: R-square of 0.918 for 1937–95 (Poole 1998).

10. We constructed the slavery index using the "rating" feature in the VOTEVIEW software program. The index is composed of 115 votes that were coded as pertaining to "slavery" by Poole and Rosenthal.

11. We verified the accuracy of members' spatial locations by reading the *Congressional Globe* and newspapers of the time. Interpreting member locations on the first dimension as representing slavery preferences corresponds extremely well with the historical evidence.

12. See Hall and Grofman 1990, and Jackson and Kingdon 1992.

13. Excerpt taken from the convention minutes, as quoted in Anbinder 1992, 167.

14. All vote totals are taken from the *Congressional Globe*, 34–1, pp. 3–337.

15. We exclude votes cast by the five major speakership candidates. There was a norm in place in the House that individuals running for speaker would not cast votes for themselves; thus, they did not vote sincerely and simply voted for individuals who had no chance at winning.

16. The caucus agreed to support Campbell for two ballots on December 7, after which Campbell would bow out gracefully (Lientz 1978, 84).

17. Again, we do not include votes cast by Richardson and Fuller. Banks did not vote, as he was the front-runner and did not want to damage his chances of winning by inflating the number of votes cast.

18. In letters and newspaper columns, Republicans vowed to oppose the "Slave Power" even if it meant balloting until March 4, 1857, the end of the congressional term (Harrington 1939, 196; Edward Barber Morgan to Henry and Richard Morgan, December 10, 1855, in Hollcroft, 1956, 450, 452; Charles Sumner to Theodore Parker, January 20, 1856, in Beverly Wilson Palmer, ed., *The Selected Letters of Charles Sumner*, 441–42).

19. A good deal of pairing occurred during this time, suppressing the overall vote totals.

20. Diary entry, Alexander H. Stephens, December 30, 1855, in Richard M. Johnston and William H. Brown, eds., *Life of Alexander H. Stephens*. 1878. Philadelphia, 300–01.

21. The Democrats first tried dropping Richardson as their speakership candidate in favor of James L. Orr of South Carolina, on January 24, which met with little success.

22. Over a dozen plurality resolutions were proposed by Republicans during the speakership contest (*Congressional Globe*, 34–1, pp. 34, 72, 84–85, 139, 149, 235, 241).

23. Aiken's first-dimension common-space NOMINATE estimate was –0.357.

24. Diary entry, Alexander H. Stephens, February 1, 1856, in Richard Malcolm Johnston and William Hand Brown, eds., *Life of Alexander H. Stephens*. 1878. Philadelphia, 305–06.

25. Is there a side-payments story here? Not in the sense that Stephens provided concessions to KNs to vote strategically. The plurality rule limited the race to Banks and Aiken: if KNs sincerely preferred Aiken to Banks, Stephens could not "buy" their votes, per se. He could, however, purchase insurance against their voting strategically for Banks—offering them committee assignments, for example—which may have occurred.

26. *Congressional Globe*, 34–1, p. 335.

27. Fuller resigned from the race on February 2, before the plurality vote (*Congressional Globe*, 34–1, p. 337).

28. Of the eleven scatters on the final vote, six were Fuller supporters, four MCs cast votes for Lewis Campbell, and one member (Hickman of PA) voted for Daniel Wells. Our spatial model predicts four of the six Fuller voters, all four of Campbell's voters, and Hickman to be closer to Banks than to Aiken. Thus, if these eleven MCs would have voted for one of the two major candidates, a sincere spatial voting model would not predict a change in the outcome; in fact, Banks would be predicted to win by a larger margin.

29. Each of the six Fuller voters sincerely preferred him to either Aiken or Banks.

30. Neither Banks, nor Fuller, nor Aiken voted on the plurality ballot.

31. The PRE provides a measure of how a given model improves upon a simple benchmark. The PRE = (Benchmark Classification Errors – Ideological Model Classification Errors)/Benchmark Classification Errors.

32. All eighteen of the regional model's classification errors were one-directional, i.e., MCs from free states who voted for Aiken. The list includes one from Maine, three from New York, one from New Jersey, one from Iowa, three from Pennsylvania, two from Indiana, three from Illinois, one from Michigan, one from Wisconsin, and two from California.

33. Aiken voters were given seven chairs, while Jacob Broom, a Fuller voter, was given the remaining one. On each of these eight committees, Banks supporters held a majority of seats (see Table 2). Most of these were simply executive oversight or housecleaning committees with no obvious connections to slavery issues.

34. Quoted in Anbinder 1992, 267.

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APPENDIX
Ballots for Speaker, 34th House

Candidates	12/3 1st	12/3 2d	12/3 3d	12/3 4th	12/4 5th	12/4 6th	12/4 7th	12/4 8th	12/4 9th	12/5 10th	12/5 11th	12/5 12th	12/5 13th	12/5 14th	12/5 15th
Richardson (D-IL)	74	74	74	72	78	75	75	75	75	72	74	73	74	74	74
Campbell (R-OH)	53	55	55	56	58	57	54	51	51	48	47	75	79	81	80
Marshall (KN-KY)	30	30	30	30	19	18	20	18	16	25	26	21	22	13	6
Banks (R-MA)	21	22	23	22	23	25	28	32	31	32	37	12	9	8	8
Fuller (KN-PA)	17	18	18	17	20	22	20	20	21	21	19	19	21	21	19
Pennington (R-NJ)	7	7	8	8	8	9	10	9	10	9	9	6	7	5	7
Scattering	23	18	16	17	18	18	17	17	19	13	11	13	10	21	25
Majority Needed	113	113	113	112	111	112	112	112	112	111	112	110	112	112	110

Candidates	12/6 16th	12/6 17th	12/6 18th	12/6 19th	12/6 20th	12/6 21st	12/7 22d	12/7 23d	12/7 24th	12/7 25th	12/7 26th	12/7 27th	12/8 28th	12/8 29th	12/8 30th
Richardson (D-IL)	72	73	72	71	71	71	73	73	74	72	72	73	73	73	73
Campbell (R-OH)	79	69	62	57	48	46	74	75	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Banks (R-MA)	6	14	18	18	23	21	11	10	41	44	46	49	86	97	98
Fuller (KN-PA)	20	21	21	23	22	21	20	16	19	22	27	28	26	18	28
Pennington (R-NJ)	9	10	11	14	19	20	9	9	18	18	17	17	8	6	5
Scattering	36	31	33	31	33	32	34	38	67	62	58	47	26	27	15
Majority Needed	112	110	109	108	109	106	111	111	111	110	111	108	110	111	110

Candidates	12/8 31st	12/8 32d	12/8 33d	12/10 34th	12/10 35th	12/10 36th	12/10 37th	12/10 38th	12/10 39th	12/11 40th	12/11 41st	12/11 42d	12/11 43d	12/11 44th	12/11 45th
Richardson (D-IL)	72	72	73	74	76	76	76	75	76	74	74	75	75	74	74
Banks (R-MA)	99	100	100	100	105	106	106	107	107	107	107	106	107	107	106
Fuller (KN-PA)	29	30	30	31	29	29	28	28	28	27	28	27	28	28	27
Scattering	21	19	19	16	15	15	14	15	15	16	16	17	16	16	16
Majority Needed	111	111	112	111	113	114	113	113	114	113	113	113	114	113	112

APPENDIX (continued)

Candidates	12/12 46th	12/12 47th	12/12 48th	12/12 49th	12/12 50th	12/13 51st	12/13 52d	12/13 53d	12/13 54th	12/13 55th	12/14 56th	12/14 57th	12/14 58th	12/14 59th	12/15 60th
Richardson (D-IL)	74	74	74	75	75	75	75	74	74	73	73	74	73	74	74
Banks (R-MA)	106	106	105	105	105	105	104	104	104	104	106	106	106	105	105
Fuller (KN-PA)	33	32	32	35	33	33	32	34	35	38	40	41	41	41	40
Scattering	11	11	12	9	11	11	11	10	9	7	5	5	5	4	5
Majority Needed	113	112	112	113	113	113	112	112	112	112	113	114	113	113	113

Candidates	12/15 61st	12/17 62d	12/17 63d	12/17 64th	12/19 65th	12/19 66th	12/20 67th	12/24 68th	12/27 69th	12/27 70th	12/27 71st	12/27 72d	12/28 73d	12/28 74th	12/28 75th
Richardson (D-IL)	74	73	73	73	73	75	73	72	66	67	67	67	68	68	68
Banks (R-MA)	105	106	105	106	102	106	103	101	100	103	103	103	101	100	101
Fuller (KN-PA)	40	37	38	38	38	34	34	31	30	31	31	31	30	31	31
Scattering	7	7	7	6	6	9	11	11	9	10	10	10	8	8	8
Majority Needed	114	112	112	112	110	113	111	108	103	106	106	106	104	104	105

Candidates	12/28 76th	12/29 77th	12/29 78th	12/29 79th	12/29 80th	12/29 81st	12/29 82d	12/29 83d	12/29 84th	1/2 85th	1/2 86th	1/3 87th	1/3 88th	1/3 89th	1/3 90th
Richardson (D-IL)	67	68	68	68	68	68	68	67	66	72	71	73	73	73	72
Banks (R-MA)	101	101	103	102	101	102	100	99	98	103	101	102	102	102	101
Fuller (KN-PA)	31	32	32	31	30	30	30	29	29	32	30	33	33	31	30
Scattering	9	8	8	8	9	9	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	8	11
Majority Needed	105	105	106	105	105	105	105	103	102	110	107	110	110	104	108

Candidates	1/4 91st	1/4 92d	1/5 93d	1/5 94th	1/7 95th	1/7 96th	1/7 97th	1/7 98th	1/9 99th	1/9 100th	1/9 101st	1/9 102d	1/9 103d	1/9 104th	1/9 105th
Richardson (D-IL)	73	73	72	72	73	73	73	72	72	68	65	68	67	67	63
Banks (R-MA)	104	104	105	98	101	99	97	99	97	90	88	92	92	92	88
Fuller (KN-PA)	34	34	32	29	29	30	30	30	33	32	28	28	26	29	28
Scattering	10	10	10	11	11	12	14	15	12	10	11	11	11	11	9
Majority Needed	111	111	110	106	108	108	108	109	108	101	97	100	99	100	95

APPENDIX (continued)

Candidates	1/9 106th	1/11 107th	1/13 108th	1/14 109th	1/14 110th	1/14 111th	1/15 112th	1/15 113th	1/15 114th	1/16 115th	1/18 116th	1/19 117th	1/21 118th	1/21 119th	1/21 120th
Richardson (D-IL)	62	70	69	66	65	64	65	65	66	65	68	69	66	67	67
Banks (R-MA)	88	98	94	95	95	95	92	92	93	88	94	94	92	91	91
Fuller (KN-PA)	27	32	34	34	33	33	34	33	33	29	32	31	31	29	28
Scattering	10	12	10	16	16	16	16	16	17	13	9	8	8	8	8
Majority Needed	94	107	104	106	105	105	104	104	105	98	102	102	99	98	98

Candidates	1/21 121st	1/23 122d	1/24 123d	1/24 124th	1/25 125th	1/25 126th	1/25 127th	1/28 128th	1/29 129th	2/2 130th	2/2 131st	2/2 132d	2/2 133d
Richardson (D-IL)	67	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Banks (R-MA)	91	90	96	95	94	94	94	97	99	102	102	102	103
Fuller (KN-PA)	29	30	12	25	28	29	25	35	34	14	13	13	6
Orr (D-SC)	0	0	68	68	66	65	64	67	69	0	0	0	0
Aiken (D-SC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	93	93	92	100
Scattering	8	9	27	13	12	11	12	7	8	6	6	6	5
Majority Needed	98	98	102	101	101	100	98	104	106	108	108	107	***